

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

Domestic Policy,

Proper to be observed on the

CONCLUSION of a PEACE.

*Non ea dixi in quibus, si non fuerint, non vinci me malim
quam vincere.*

CICER. LUCUL.



L O N D O N :

Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand.

MDCCLXI.

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
Domestic Policy,

Proposed to be observed on the

CONSTITUTIONAL PEACE.



Printed by J. G. & Co. in the Strand, London.



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ON THE

DOMESTIC POLICY,

Proper to be observed on the CONCLUSION
of a PEACE.

THE victories and successes with which it has pleased God to bless our arms in the course of this war, having at length brought our enemies to sue for peace, we have great reason to expect, from the prudence and vigour that have of late prevailed in our councils, that during the negotiations, the interest of the nation will be zealously attended to, and such a barrier placed against the restless ambition of our neighbouring kingdom, as will put it out of its power to disturb our tranquillity for a considerable time to come. But when we have once secured ourselves by an honourable peace from the ambition and insults of our neighbours, it will be extremely proper to turn our eyes homeward, and studiously to pursue such a plan of domestic policy as may have the greatest tendency to promote the prosperity of the nation. No other advantages whatever can make up for the neglect of this policy. Victories gained, and territories acquired are of no account without it; but a nation that adheres to it steadily,

dily, will not only weather almost every calamity, but will increase in strength and vigour even in the midst of distresses.

Great Britain tho' happily victorious over her enemies, yet for many years past has been fatally deficient in several essential points relating to the internal policy of the state, which if not now redressed will render our present prosperity extremely precarious, and in a great measure blast all the successes of our arms. The pernicious effects of corrupt administration have long been generally felt and complained of, and many private efforts have been made to check their baneful influence; but the ignorance or wilful inactivity of those in power, from time to time frustrated those patriot attempts, which no way suited with their system of government.

At length, however, the mean arts of corruption, which have precipitated the nation into a most distressful and dangerous situation, have been nobly discountenanced by the highest authority, and all honest men have been invited from the throne to co-operate with their sovereign in advancing the prosperity of the nation. This royal invitation will no doubt animate the zeal of men of integrity, will revive an active spirit of patriotism among all ranks, and prompt those who have their country's welfare at heart, to pursue with ardour and resolution, the means most likely to reform the public abuses, and restore health and vigour to the constitution. If the present golden opportunity be properly improved, we may so far, as the vicissitude of human affairs will permit, give a stability to the grandeur of the British empire, and secure, not only to ourselves, but to our posterity, the most valuable blessing of public liberty; but if our political grievances,

grievances, and the great depravity of manners which they have introduced, be suffered to remain unchecked and uncontrolled, it is to be feared that they will quickly be attended with ruin and desolation.

Much will depend upon the deliberations of this present parliament; but the wished for reformation may also, in some measure, be promoted even by persons in private stations, as the domestic policy of a state is a subject equally open to every one conversant in history, and who by his natural inclination is led to turn his thoughts to matters of government. The author of the following reflections has endeavoured to delineate the outlines of such a plan of policy as he hopes would tend to advance the prosperity of Britain; and he will think himself extremely happy if any thing here suggested can afford the least hint to those who make the welfare of this nation their care and study.

As it is the opinion of many judicious writers that the population of Britain has been declining for these several years past, and that we have not of late had a sufficient number of men to carry on our various manufactures, and at the same time to fight our battles, the utmost attention ought to be given to remedy this capital deficiency. At the conclusion of a war, which is a time of dissipation, many of our people being at a loss how to dispose of themselves at home, are apt to rove abroad; therefore it ought to be our principal concern immediately upon the ratification of the treaties, to provide for the soldiers, sailors, and carpenters discharged from the public service. Their number will be very considerable, probably no fewer than 40,000 soldiers, 40,000 sailors, and 4000 carpenters and labourers, in all

84,000 men. It is not an overstrained supposition, to imagine that 16,000 women and children depend upon these, which will make the number of those deprived of a livelihood at the peace to amount to 100,000.

At the end of last war a settlement was made in Nova Scotia, which served as an asylum to several thousand of the discharged troops, and has been supported annually by grants from parliament ever since. As we have increased our territories in America during this war, and have large tracts of land on that continent uncultivated, it has lately been proposed by some to make new settlements there for our discharged soldiers, where they could easily procure a subsistence, and would serve to protect the frontiers, and awe the Indians.

On the other hand I will venture to propose that they should all be provided for, if possible, in the island of Britain; not that I mean, in the least, to derogate from the importance of the settlement of Hallifax, which has fully answered the purposes it was intended for. But if we secure the exclusive navigation of the lakes, have a fortress about Oswego or at Frontenac, and keep two armed frigates stationed in the Mississippi and the Ohio, our frontiers would be fully protected, and the Indians thoroughly awed; for if their natural acuteness be such as it is represented, they could not but perceive our unrivaled superiority, so that their own interest would lead them to court our friendship rather than contend with our power. In all probability we shall have no hostile disputes in America for many years, but what may be decided by the strength of the colonies; therefore there is no great necessity of providing for our security before-hand by leaving a military force in that continent. But no one can answer for the
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continuance of the tranquillity in Europe, as the French, however beaten and exhausted, recruit their vigour in a few years; the thirst of the Germans for bloody squabbles seems incurable, and the claims in Italy may perhaps be referred to the arbitration of the sword.

It would no doubt be thought madness to transport our grand magazine of arms from the Tower to America; but I had much rather that our arsenal should be transported thither than our sensible men. As our colonies are now out of their infant state, it is needless to be providing with great earnestness for the farther peopling of them; for if the tranquillity of the inhabitants be secured, they will of themselves multiply sufficiently. A gentleman of Philadelphia, to whom the world is indebted for several ingenious philosophic discoveries, has shewn that the colonists in general double their numbers by procreation alone every twenty-five years; so that in half a century the plantations will be four times as populous as they are at present; whereas if we do not give our attention to supply the drains from the mother country, in all probability, our numbers fifty years hence, will not be increased one eighth part of the present inhabitants. It is doubtless of more importance to the nation that the numbers of people should increase in this and the neighbouring island than in America; for a ship might as well attempt to carry her lading hung to the end of her bolt-sprit as a government to manage a people widely dispersed, and more numerous towards the extremities than towards the center. I may therefore ask any colonist who desires the prosperity of the British empire, whether he would not rather wish to see three millions more of inhabitants

habitants in Britain and Ireland than six in America.

But by what better means can Britain be peopled than by retaining her native subjects, especially those, who in return for the labours and fatigues they have undergone in the service of the public, have a most just claim to its protection. If the propriety of settling the troops at home be allowed, we ought next to think of disposing of them in such a manner as would render their settlements of the greatest advantage to the nation. As the sea which encompasses us, is both our rampart and the channel of our wealth, the more we are habituated to it, the more we shall be in a capacity of defending ourselves, and of annoying our enemies, and the greater opportunities we shall have of advancing the trade and increasing the riches of the nation. By multiplying our settlements, therefore, on the sea coasts, and on the banks of navigable rivers, we at the same form nurseries for future navies, and render it more easy for great numbers of men to procure a subsistence. Were the banks of all the navigable rivers in Great Britain lined with settlements, it may easily be conceived what an immense population this fruitful island could admit of. There are doubtless at present more inhabitants on the banks of the Thames, reckoning within two miles on each side of the river, than there were in the whole island when it was invaded by Julius Cæsar; yet from the source of the river to its mouth what an abundance of the necessaries and conveniencies of life prevails. The many large and populous cities situated on the banks of the Rhine and of the Maese in Flanders are so far from incommoding each other by their numbers of inhabitants, that when the latter were more populous than they are

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at present, they were also more flourishing. These examples shew us that numbers of people are so far from distressing one another by their vicinity, that if they are industrious, they are mutual helps to each other.

How erroneous then is the common opinion, that it is impossible to earn a livelihood at home, and that we must either turn ourselves to foreign commerce, or seek to get possession of some new plantation, where we may have full scope to raise such a revenue from the ground as will make us live in plenty. If land can be procured cheap in America, so can it also be in Britain, nay, I may say, in some places of this island cheaper than in those parts of America where the settlements would be of the greatest national importance. Dean Swift in computing the difficulties that new settlers have to encounter with in America from grubbing up of trees, from the high rate of the wages of artificers, and from other inconveniencies, reckons that their lands, tho' given them, in their original state, as a present, may justly be said to cost them an hundred years purchase before they be brought to a state of cultivation. Allowing that the Dean has exaggerated his computation, yet the expence of new settlements in those countries, where nothing besides the common fruits of the earth are raised, must doubtless be either very considerable, or the profits arising from the settlements must be trifling. By the confession of a gentlemen who had a grant of lands at Hallifax the clearing of one acre cost him between forty and fifty pounds, and when it was cleared it was hardly of any service, the soil being of a light sandy barren nature. He could not certainly have laid out his money to greater disadvantage in attempting improvements in many unculti-

uncultivated parts of this island. The revenue raised from the ground in Britain at present, is not one half, nay one fourth of what it might be, and exclusive of the products of the earth which might be thus increased, the sea which washes all our coasts affords an easy subsistence to the inhabitants. A very little land, when well cultivated, will supply food for one man, therefore to give large tracts of uncultivated land in a remote country, as a subsistence to a poor man, is an useless, if not a most burdensome present. It would be of more advantage to him to make him the proprietor of a small house and garden in the midst of his friends, where to the produce of his garden, he could add a certain revenue by his application to some handicraft or manufacture.

The labour and fatigue the troops have undergone during the war will now make repose the more grateful to them, and if they can have but a settled habitation which they can call their own, they will not probably be very solicitous to have a sumptuous one. From the small buildings erected near Chelsea hospital, we may see that the invalids prefer the happiness of domestic liberty in a hut, to the being crowded in the magnificent apartments of a palace. As companionship is greatly cultivated among soldiers, it will be no small satisfaction to them to live together in civil life; therefore it would be adviseable, when they are discharged, to settle them in small bodies in different parts of the kingdom not occupied by other inhabitants, conferring such small immunities upon them as should encourage them to nestle, by rendering their subsistence as little expensive as possible. As their daily intercourse with each other would keep alive their martial disposition, they would be ready to be formed into an army
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upon any other emergency; but supposing they should never again appear in the field in the quality of soldiers, their children might, and the advantage of the establishments proposed, would, in other respects, be very considerable to the nation.

Tho' many enlist from a spirit of idleness; yet great numbers enter into the service from a spirit of enterprize, and are far from putting off their industry when they put on the red coat. Some of these, who perhaps may have improved themselves by observations in their travels, will now be inclined to profit by the remarks they have made, and their diligence and activity will animate the slothful, who, if left to their own direction, would probably become either a burden or a nuisance to society.

Tho' it should seem expensive to form the proposed establishments effectually, yet that consideration ought not to deter us, as the national benefit arising from them would be so considerable. But if it should be found that the disposing of the soldiers in this manner would even be less expensive than the methods hitherto pursued in providing for them, that ought to be another motive for settling them at home.

The expences of the settlement of Nova Scotia for the ten years following the first establishment of it, exclusive of the guards and garrisons in that country, amount to 582,270 £. and the charge of the out pensioners in Chelsea, during the same number of years is 478,448 £. and both united make the sum of 1,060,718 £. If the same plan for providing for the troops be observed at the following peace, it is reasonable to suppose that the same expences would be incurred during the ten following years.

On the other hand let us take a view of the expences of the settlements proposed. We shall suppose the 40,000 soldiers (for we shall speak of the carpenters and sailors by themselves) to be settled in twenty establishments of 2000 men each in different parts of Britain, upon lakes or navigable rivers, or places adjoining to the sea, each man having an house and an acre of land assigned him, free for ten years, and to be upon the Chelsea out-pension for the first year after the forming of the establishment. There are many places in Britain where the land is still lying uncultivated and desolate, and doubtless some such tracts could be found near the sea, or on the banks of the Severn, the Trent, the Ouse, the Tyne, the Forth, the Tay, the Clyde, or on the lakes of Scotland, and the rent of such in their present condition cannot be above a shilling an acre, which makes the rent of the whole for ten years 20,000 £. Gentlemen who have wide estates, with some corners of them uncultivated, would even find it for their advantage to give the ground, for such settlements, for ten years *gratis*; as at the end of that term they would have 2000 additional tenants, who would be in a capacity of paying rent both for their land and houses. Landed gentlemen are very sensible of the advantage of having their grounds well stocked with cattle; but a little reflection would shew them that it would be much more profitable to stock them with men and women, who may always be induced to apply themselves to industry, if mildly governed and prudently advised.

The next article of the expence of these settlements, is the houses, which built in hut fashion, as is generally the manner of new settlers, could not exceed the charge of ten pounds each, exclusive of the soldiers own labour in erecting them.

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Those only that are married, who may be reckoned about one fifth of the whole number, ought to have houses to themselves, and the others, who are batchelors, might very well be lodged four in one house, till such time as they should marry. The number of houses would then be 16,000, and the expence of erecting them 160,000 £. The last article to be mentioned is the out-pension for 40,000 men, making the sum of 304,333 £. and this added to the two former articles amounts to 484,333 £. which is the whole charge of the settlements, and is not ^{more} above two thirds of the expences of the colony of Nova Scotia.

No body, I am persuaded, will contest the advantages that would arise to the nation from such settlements. Two of the wisest princes of Europe, the king of Prussia and the king of Denmark have given their attention to the increasing the number of villages in their dominions. The King of Prussia, before the present war, established no less than sixty new villages in Pomerania, and the king of Denmark, whose conduct is directed upon patriot principles, not many months ago encouraged by his royal bounty several new settlers in Holstein.

Some may, perhaps, alledge that the allowance of one acre to one man is not sufficient, as three acres are generally computed to be requisite for the subsistence of one person. But I would desire those to reflect that it is not intended either that the settlers should draw all their subsistence from the ground, or that the government should furnish the whole of it to them. The cultivation of the land ought to be the employment of only a few of the settlers, and all of them having a share in its produce, ought to expect the remaining part of their subsistence from their application to some

trade or handicraft. On this plan they would find that a house and one acre at home would be of greater advantage to them than fifty acres in America.

Tho' they could not at first apply to work with the assiduity of common workmen, yet the application of six hours a-day might be expected from them, and it would be very hard indeed, if so many hours industry should not be worth sixpence, so that their subsistence in time of peace would not probably fall short of what it had been in time of war. To attach them to industry it would perhaps be proper that their houses should be built contiguous; that all those of one trade should live together; that the town should be surrounded with a small earthen rampart; that a vigorous civil discipline should be established by voluntary election; that it should be penal to be seen lounging in a forenoon; that no public-house should be opened before six in the evening; and that premiums should be annually conferred on the most active and industrious.

There is a more pressing necessity for establishments of this kind in Scotland than in any other part of the island, and still more particularly in the Highlands, where the people want examples and motives to reconcile them to industry. The travels of those Highlanders who have been employed in the public service, will have opened their minds, so that when they return home, they cannot but be fully sensible of the naked and uncultivated state of their own country. None, therefore, could be more proper than they would be, to introduce new improvements into their country, as their countrymen would be much more apt to imitate them than any others. The nature of that part of the island would require that the
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settlements should be small and numerous, that all the subsistence each township wanted might be raised within its own neighbourhood. Were there many such small townships to be formed in different parts in the Highlands, it would be a certain means of curing the indolence of the present inhabitants, who do not want for vigour of mind if models of industry were set before them. The soil in Swisserland is even more rugged and the winter more rigorous than in the worst parts of this island; yet that country, we find, is extremely populous; and no doubt if attention were given to cultivate the Highlands they would be able to support six times the number of the present inhabitants. Tho' there have been numerous levies raised in the Highlands during the present war; yet that is far from being a proof of their populousness, as some have concluded: on the contrary it shews that they are at this time more exhausted than they have been for many years. In England, where the people employ themselves in trades and manufactures, scarce one in forty is tempted to enlist; whereas among the Highlanders we have seen, within these few years, both striplings and men in advanced age, quitting their habitations to serve in remote countries, and the father, son, and grandson engaged in the same battle. Therefore when mention is made of the numbers raised on this occasion, if we, at the same time, reflect on the manner how they have been raised, the notion of the populousness of the country will immediately vanish.

The state of the Highlands, even to this day, in some manner resembles that of Scandinavia in the time of the incursion of the Goths into the Roman empire. As celibacy is very rare among the inhabitants, and they generally marry young, they are

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consequently prolific; but notwithstanding their numerous issue, the number of their villages and cottages hardly ever increases, and their country from generation to generation has remained almost a desert waste. The young brood were always either swept off by intestine broils, or foreign wars, or were prompted by necessity to abandon their native hills and vales, where industry met with all kinds of discouragement from their leading men, who were blind to its advantages, or wilfully wanted to shut it out, that they might the more easily tyrannize over their wretched vassals. The words of Cæsar in his account of the German states, might very justly be applied to their chiefs: *Illis maxima laus est, quam latissimas circum se vastatis finibus solitudines habere.* Tho' for these several years past, the landed gentlemen in that part of the country have been fully sensible of the bad effects of the former wretched policy; yet the common people for want of instructors still continue ignorant of the advantages of trades and new settlements. For example, if a Highlander has three or four sons, the eldest of course is successor to his father in his cottage and his effects, but no thought is taken to provide for the others, by breeding one of them a weaver, another a carpenter, or another a smith. No, the young lads lounge about as herds to the cattle, till a recruiting serjeant comes, and by a few flattering words, and shewing them a bit of splendid metal, persuades them to go and sell their blood to foreigners for a groat a-day. The present occasion is extremely favourable for introducing new maxims among them; and as there never were so many Highlanders employed at one time in the public service as during this war, if those of them who shall be discharged at the peace, were to be settled

settled in the manner above proposed, on the forfeited estates in their country, and by encouragements kept to industry, their numbers would greatly add to the influence of their example. Allowing even that they should make but little progress in trades and manufactures, they would at least serve as a nursery for future levies of brave and hardy men, zealously attached to the government, and that consideration alone ought to be an inducement to promote the establishments proposed, especially in that country.

It is of still greater importance to the nation that some expedient should be thought of for procuring a subsistence for the discharged sailors and carpenters, and for preventing them from going abroad into the service of foreigners at the conclusion of the war. If we neglect to provide for them, our rivals will undoubtedly profit by our negligence. We restore to the French at the peace about 24,000 prisoners; most of them seafaring men, whose ardour for business will no doubt be whetted by their tedious confinement here, which has thrown them so many years back in the pursuit of their fortunes. We have taken from them almost all their shipping, consequently when a free navigation is opened to them by the peace, new vessels will be put upon the stocks in all their ports, and the greatest encouragement given to ship carpenters, who may depend upon constant employment for a long time. If therefore the French should wheedle over 10,000 of our sailors and ship carpenters, who are ungratefully left to starve in their own country, ought we to be surpris'd to see their shipping in a few years in as flourishing a condition as it was before the war, and their commerce as extensive.

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To save ourselves from future regrets on this subject, we ought now to make it our study to find full employment for all our sailors and carpenters at home, and this can be effected by nothing so well as establishing and encouraging an extensive herring fishery. This rich traffic, which Providence has laid at our feet, if well conducted might prove the chief support of the grandeur of the nation. The small progress we have hitherto made in establishing it cannot be attributed to the want of natural advantages, or to our unaptness for the sea; but must be owing either to the expensive or improper means of carrying it on, or to our slighting it from an opinion that it is not a channel of trade worthy of our attention. It cannot, however, be thought to be trifling or of small national importance by those who reflect that it annually affords a maintenance to 500,000 persons in Holland, and that the Dutch, by the computation of Sir Walter Raleigh and others, raise by it several millions Sterling annually. The great utility of the fishery having been so often and so fully demonstrated, let us, notwithstanding the difficulties we have hitherto struggled with, still persevere in our design of establishing it, and even prosecute it at this time with new vigour. Let us give our chief attention to improve our natural advantages, which will greatly lessen the expence, and we need not fear soon to turn the balance so much in our favour, as to be able to continue the trade both to private and national benefit.

If the Dutch could catch the herrings on their own coasts, would not they think themselves happy to save a voyage of 200 leagues. No one certainly that has a mine in Cornwall would chuse to lodge his miners in Devonshire or Wales. As the
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western islands are allowed to be the very center of the fishery, stiled by the Dutch *a golden mine*, would not reason require that they should also be the chief residence of the fishermen, especially as in those parts, the fishery is not a temporary employment of a few weeks, but might be carried on, in different branches, almost the whole year round.

The situation, soil, and climate of those islands, when but considered with the least attention, all invite us to make settlements upon them, if we wish to prosecute the fishery in a successful manner. Their situation is admirable, not only as the fish surround all their coasts, and fill their bays and creeks, which renders large buffes unnecessary, and enables the fishermen to sleep on shore several nights of the week; but also as the navigation from them is so convenient either to the northern kingdoms, the Mediterranean, or the West Indies. Their climate is much more mild than that of the opposite continent, and their winters are very rarely rigorous. The soil, tho' but badly cultivated by the present inhabitants, is, however, so fertile that it yields in several places thirty, sixty, and even sometimes an hundred-fold. Almost all the islands contain a great abundance of marle, so that were they to be cultivated to their greatest extent, they would admit of being extremely populous without any other support besides agriculture.

But if there was not an inch of mould upon them, such is their happy situation for trade, and such the riches of the fishery upon their coasts, that if these advantages were improved by the industry of men, a flourishing city might support itself upon each of the larger islands. Attica, tho' anciently very populous, was always noted

for its barrenness. The large and magnificent city of Genoa, stands on a mountainous, rocky and barren coast, which according to the testimony of the elegant historian Folieta, is so far from supplying provisions to its capital, that it draws its chief support from that trading city; *Natum enim non Genuam a Liguria, sed sterilem Liguriam a Genua ali.* The Belgic islands, or the islands of Zeland, in the time of Cæsar, were only inhospitable morasses, with scarce any other inhabitants than wild sea-fowls; but at this day we see them well cultivated and crowded with beautiful and populous towns. As the western islands lie so conveniently for the navigation to America, and our intercourse with that continent is daily increasing, as they enjoy as favourable a climate as those of Zeland, belong to as industrious and enterprising a people, and are surrounded with an inexhaustable fund of wealth, the following century may perhaps see many flourishing towns upon them, and multitudes of ships frequenting their ports. This will not appear a surprizing supposition to a person who considers the flux of human things.

The chief objection hitherto made against pursuing the fishery is, that the whole profit, and more than the profit, is consumed by the great expences attending the trade, and indeed according to the measures that have yet been observed, it could hardly have been expected to have been otherwise. The busses are built large as if intended for foreign voyages; they are only employed a few months of the year; they are fitted out at a great expence; the sailors and fishermen are not interested in the success of the fishery, by being made partners in it; and a trifling home consumption at extravagant prices, has been more studied than a foreign trade at small profits.

Let

Let the means pursued for the future be but the reverse of these, and we need not despair of success. Instead of laying up the buffes half the year in places remote from the center of the trade, and where the charge of repairs is rendered expensive by the high prices both of materials and of mens labour; let magazines and storehouses be formed in the western islands, which lie equally convenient for receiving naval stores from the Baltic or America. The company thus having dock-yards of their own, and workmen at low wages, the charge of fitting out and of repairs would be considerably diminished; and the fishermen, being constantly employed almost at their own doors, in small vessels for nine or ten months of the year, the profits of the trade would be greatly increased.

The discharged carpenters and sailors ought to be tempted by considerable advantages and immunities, to make those islands the place of their habitation. Those of them who are married ought each of them to have some small allowance for building an house; for their private stocks cannot be supposed to be large, and to have a home that a person can call his own is no small inducement to sobriety and industry. If they should even be freed from the payment of all taxes and duties for seven years, and their ports be left open, on condition of forfeiting this last privilege, if they imported more than what served for their own consumption, the public revenue would scarce feel any diminution. As they could not be supposed to have much money, they could purchase nothing from foreigners but by the sale of their own staple commodity, and to indulge them with the free bartering of it to supply their own consumption

sumption would be a powerful inducement to their settling in those islands.

This would also be a great temptation to foreigners to settle there, if at the same time they were allowed the full enjoyment of all the privileges of native subjects. Foreign fishermen, even without such encouragement, have seemed inclined to take up their residence in the islands subject to Britain; were the government therefore to invite them by the offer of immunities and privileges, it is but reasonable to expect that great numbers from Hamburg, Norway and Holland, would embrace the opportunity of living under our laws. Mr. Martin in his account of the western isles, tells us, " That after the restoration, a few Dutch families settled in Stornway in the isle of Lewis; but some cunning merchants found means by the secretaries to prevail with king Charles to send them away, tho' they not only brought money into the island, but taught the inhabitants something of the art of fishing. The small idea of fishing they had from the Dutch has had such an effect as to make the people of the little village of Stornway to excel all those of the neighbouring isles and continent, ever since that time." In another place he says, " That the inhabitants of the town of Lerwick in Zetland, in the space of thirty years, increased from three or four families to three hundred, chiefly by the arrival of foreigners." By the former of these instances it appears, that if foreigners could be tempted to settle on those islands, they would not only contribute to the national wealth and strength by their own industry, but would also instruct the natives how to earn a subsistence, many of whom, we are told by the same author, transmigrate annually into other countries

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for want of knowing how to employ themselves at home.

If the sailors and fishermen were to share in the success of the fishery, 'tis natural to conclude that they would be more attentive to improve all opportunities and advantages; and in case of an unsuccessful season, or any other cross accidents, the loss would not fall so heavy on those who employed their money in promoting the trade. In Holland, and several places in North Britain, the custom is that the seamen go out adventurers, and they themselves, it is said, look upon this as the most reasonable and encouraging way. No good argument, I think, can be assigned for not making this the general practice thro' the whole trade. Let no other workmen therefore be employed, in any branch of the fishery, exclusive of the twine spinners, net-makers, and others in the most servile offices, unless they agree to go sharers in the profit and loss of the trade; that is, let the ship-carpenters, rope-makers, sail-makers, coopers, sailors, and fishermen be jointly concerned with the merchant in fitting a buss for the sea, by which method, if they can but merely save themselves from being losers by the fishing, they are severally gainers, having procured employment, each in his respective occupation.

As the forming of docks, erecting magazines, dressing of hemp, spinning of twine, making of nets, would be great articles of expence, the following proposal for removing in a great measure that heavy charge may perhaps deserve the consideration of the public. Let all the convicts, who, according to the present method, are annually transported from Britain to America, be for the future sent to some of the small western islands close adjoining to the greater ones
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and employed as slaves in hard labour on the different branches above specified. When our colonies were in their infancy, and America was regarded as a Siberia, it is no wonder that transportation thither should be looked upon as a punishment; but in the present populousness and civilized state of our colonies, it cannot be accounted the least hardship to convicts to be carried from a life of misery and indigence here, and landed in a fruitful country and favourable climate among civilized people who speak their own language. Besides, *Cælum non animum mutant*: as the voyage to America seldom alters the dispositions of the convicts, they are looked upon as a nuisance there, and some of them who have turned packmen, have been accused of practising their roguery upon the unwary Indians, and thereby alienating them from this nation, and even giving rise to hostilities and wars betwixt them and us. On the other hand were they to be transported to the small western islands, as to so many prisons, and there kept at hard labour with an allowance of coarse fare and mean lodging and cloathing, the dread of such a punishment would doubtless be a greater restraint upon many villains than Tyburn itself. Besides, when convicts are confined to a small secluded spot, they cannot there corrupt others by their bad example; they are there secure from their former temptations; their banishment thither is a real punishment; and if care is taken to force them to work and be industrious, there they have the best chance of reforming and growing good.

The people at home, who, are fond of fashionable novelties, giving extravagant prices for British herrings, foreign markets were thereupon slighted, as the small profits they yielded bore no proportion to the expensive manner of carrying on
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the trade. The great home consumption, however, was but of very short continuance, the dearth of the commodity having soon abated the ardour of the people for purchasing it; and the demand ceasing at home, the course of the trade which had scarce any other channel, was immediately stopt. There is plainly not the least need of any public encouragement for supplying the markets at home, where the commodity is so plentiful, and in such a superabundance that the people, for want of knowing how to dispose of the fish they caught, have often been obliged to use them as manure for their lands. When fish are in such plenty on any, even the remotest, coasts of Britain, nothing but extortion or mismanagement can make them dear in any of our great cities that have a free communication with the sea. The bounty therefore ought to be limited solely to those fish that are carried to a foreign market; and considering this gratuity, and the great superiority of our natural advantages, were we to study carefully the least expensive methods of conducting the trade, by carrying it on thro' all the seasons, and by building and fitting out the busses where workmanship and naval stores were at low prices, there is the greatest reason to expect that we might soon be able to undersell the Dutch at foreign ports.

The herrings as they fall from the net are reckoned to cost the Dutch six shillings a barrel, and it is computed that we might have them for two. Mr. Martin even says that they have been bought in the western islands for a groat a barrel. The Dutch have no salt of their own, but are obliged to buy part of what they use from us. Naval stores can be carried from the Baltic to the western islands, as cheap as from thence to Holland.

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The ports of Britain are open all the year round; but several of those of Holland, are often frozen up for months together. We lie more convenient than the Dutch, for the navigation to America, and to the southern and northern parts of Europe; and if they can fare hard and be very laborious, they are in those points exceeded by the bold fishermen of the western and northern islands, who satisfy themselves with a very scanty subsistence, and make no scruple of braving the wintery seas in small open boats.

To succeed in establishing the fishery, I believe, it would be found prudent not to aim at carrying it on all at once in the most extensive manner; for it may be doubted whether such attempts have not been among the chief causes of the small progress we have hitherto made in this valuable trade. Suppose a company of the richest merchants in the nation, had attempted in the infancy of our hardware manufacture, to enlarge it at once to its present extent, by undertaking to build such a city as Birmingham in four or five summers, and to people it with manufacturers in that branch, they would have found the enterprize too hard for them; and the profits no way compensating the expence, the design would have absolutely ruined the undertakers. In like manner were the fishery to be prosecuted in all the large sea-port towns, the detached equipments, would from the general unacquaintedness with the new branch of business, become very expensive, and the profits, for the same reason, be but inconsiderable, which would quickly bring the trade under disrepute, and make the adventurers lay aside all thoughts of prosecuting it. If we should light a great number of small tapers in different places, they would be liable to be blown out with every blast; but

were we to examine where there is the greatest abundance of fuel, and to light up a small fire in that spot, it would soon gather strength, and gradually widen its circle till it became a large blaze. Let us, therefore, give our chief attention to promote the fishery in those places where the natural advantages for carrying it on are most apparent, and no matter how small, or how weak its first beginnings are, if we persevere in cherishing a vital principle, it will increase annually, and in a short time diffuse itself widely thro' the whole nation. The restricting the chief bounties and privileges to those who should fish in the western islands, could not in the least make the undertaking the less national. How many who have plantations in the West Indies manage their concerns in those remote islands, without stirring out of Britain? It could not then be thought difficult for the merchants of London, or of other cities in Britain, to transact business in the western islands, which are so situated that the correspondence of letters could not meet with the least interruption.

Tho' many of the discharged carpenters and sailors should not agree to engage in the fishery, and settle in the Western islands, they ought nevertheless to be provided for by some other establishments in Britain, as it is now more necessary for us than ever to encourage seamen, and to be formidable at sea. The French, in consequence of our conquests during this war, have now less to defend, and are therefore more at liberty to act offensively. We, on the other hand, for the same reason, can less exert ourselves in an offensive manner for having so much to defend. Our numerous settlements on the continent and islands of America, have an extensive frontier, which is exposed for several thousand miles to an enemy,

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and can only be defended by maintaining a superiority at sea. If the exertive power of a state, I mean that power always ready to be put in action, does not keep pace with the enlargement of its boundaries, the new acquisitions made only tend to weaken the nation, by affording an enemy greater opportunities of invading it. The Spaniards, in the time of Philip II. boasted that the sun never set on their territories; but their naval force bearing no proportion to the wide extent of their dominions, their overgrown power was soon pulled down by a small state, whom but a few years before they had looked upon with the greatest contempt. Having neglected to support their marine, they lost their superiority at sea, and were thereby cut off from affording protection to their foreign settlements, which were reduced in all parts of the world by the Dutch, who wisely prosecuted trade with the utmost assiduity, and gave a watchful attention to naval armaments.

Our insular situation happily freeing us from the charge of land frontiers, we can the more easily afford a powerful protection to our sea frontier, which has this peculiar advantage, that a European enemy, before he can attack it, must remove far from his own country, and consequently invade at great disadvantage. But as fleets alone can protect our foreign settlements, we ought to avoid making too great a reduction in our marine article, or at least we ought to make such a provision for the sailors who shall be discharged that upon any sudden emergency, we may always have a sufficient number of them ready to man a powerful squadron for immediate service. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that a navy neglected is a navy destroyed. Have we not found by sad experience, that the reducing of our marine in time

of peace to 16,000 men, was almost the same thing as if it had been totally annihilated. Let our past mistakes therefore serve to instruct us in our future conduct.

Were we to be in a condition at all times of prosecuting hostilities at sea, and it is there only, that in the beginning of a war, we can have occasion to prosecute them, our enemies would be very careful how they committed any thing that looked like an infraction of the peace. Hitherto, presuming upon our over security, and our being always unprovided in time of peace, they have been tempted to make light of treaties, and secured by fraud such advantages as gave them the actual superiority for the two or three first campaigns of a war, while we were only in a capacity of making weak efforts and fruitless exertions.

If we had a formidable naval strength ready to be exerted upon the least rupture, a war, which on account of the false steps made by us, and the losses we suffer in the first campaigns, has usually been continued for seven or eight years, would probably be terminated in half that time, and much blood and treasure be saved to the nation. A judicious and elegant author has most fully and clearly illustrated the propriety of maintaining 36,000 seamen in time of peace. His arguments and illustrations are couched in such nervous expressions, and have all such a mutual relation and connection, that to abridge them would be doing an injustice both to the author and my readers, who will have great satisfaction in perusing that masterly performance*. Let us make an estimate of the expences of tenders and prebengals, who ought to be otherwise employ-

* See three dialogues on the navy by Mr. Moncrief.

ed, of bounties for seamen, of the increased wages of sailors on board the merchant ships, and of the extravagant insurance paid for merchandize and shipping, the charge of all these during a war, would amount to a much higher sum than what would be required for maintaining a standing body of seamen during many years of peace. If, besides the expence of these articles, we consider the inconvenience of not being able to prosecute a war for the first two or three years to any advantage, how improvident will our past conduct appear.

Some French writers, who have lately treated of commerce, have proposed that all the coasts of France should be turned into sea-ports; and it would seem that their government had begun to act upon this principle by the expence bestowed upon the harbour of Cherbourg, lately destroyed by our troops, which owed its being a port almost wholly to art. As our numbers of seafaring people greatly exceed those of the French, as our prosperity is intimately connected with the sea, and our coasts are more extensive than those of any other nation in Europe, we ought to adopt the maxim of the French writers above-mentioned, and multiply our sea-ports upon all our coasts. Those sailors, therefore, who should scruple to engage in the fishery, might be settled part of them on the coasts of the Channel, and part at Milford haven, and might be engaged by a small bounty to be ready to man a squadron, upon any occasion, if the government should at length be convinced of the expediency of maintaining a considerable naval force in time of peace. The crews of the royal yachts, tho' seldom employed, are kept always ready for duty by the allowance of their monthly wages, which is only about a third
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part of their expence when in actual service. By extending this bounty to several thousand sailors, we might have it always in our power to send a squadron to sea with the greatest dispatch, and thereby to stifle those sparks of contention which might otherwise set all Europe in flames.

Now also is the time for making the necessary works at Milford haven, to fit that place for a royal dock-yard; and likewise for undertaking the large repairs and alterations that may be judged expedient in the other docks. To prosecute such expensive works during a war, when they might safely be deferred till a time of peace, is the height of imprudence and mismanagement. By such a conduct the expence of the nation is not only enhanced, at a time when all unnecessary charges ought to be retrenched, but numbers of workmen are also left without employment during peace, when it is still necessary that they should practise those trades upon which the strength of the nation does not a little depend.

But upon the establishment of a dock-yard at Milford haven, care ought to be taken to form it upon a less wasteful plan than that of the other yards. Such new regulations might easily be made, as would at the same time promote both the service of the government and the advantage of the workmen, which are no ways incompatible with each other. More particularly a reform ought absolutely to be made in two material articles, I mean the tap-house and the chips, which are only encouragements to idleness and fraud, and are openly condemned by the sober part of the workmen*. Great numbers of ship-carpenters

* The porter is allowed the privilege of keeping an open beer-house in the middle of the yard, which serves as a lounging

might be employed in time of peace, in forming the frames of ships to be stored up in magazines; as is the manner in Holland, by which means the government would not have such a pressing occasion for hiring supernumerary workmen in time of war; and would save considerably by being under no necessity of building ships in private yards, which are found not to be so serviceable as those built in the king's docks.

Tho' the settlements above proposed may, perhaps, at first view appear to be rather too chargeable to the government, yet rating them even at the highest estimate they will be found not to equal the expence of other establishments, which the nation has made no scruple of supporting very liberally. The two articles of expence, which I have already named, exceed the charge of the settlements I propose. Let us, for instance, sum up the grants for Nova Scotia, and the out-pensioners of Chelsea hospital for ten years, the amount of the whole will be found greatly to exceed the charge of the proposed settlements. Nova Scotia being now a regular civil government, and under no apprehensions from a French enemy, can no longer require subsidies from the public. Supposing this article sunk, the second would in a great measure be absorbed in the new establishments, as it is proposed to limit the out-pension almost wholly to those who resided in the new settlements. Some few, who

find place for sots and idle workmen. The worst workmen are noted for haunting it, and on the other hand, it is the distinguishing character of the best artists, that they almost never enter it.

The chips that fall from the ax are the perquisite of the carpenters, but this pretended privilege is shamefully abused by many workmen, who make up their bundle of chips by cutting useful wood to pieces, by which it may be easily demonstrated that, in time of war, the government loses more than 100,000 pounds annually.

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were absolute invalids might perhaps find just reasons for being accepted, but let us even make a deduction of one half of the out-pension for their support; yet the other half, if added to the article above mentioned, would make a sum larger than that which would be required for maintaining the new establishments.

It ought also to be considered that the sums expended for the settlements of the soldiers, and for the support of the fishery, would not resemble the other expences of government, but like the money laid out by traders and manufacturers, would quickly more than repay itself by the large profits made. Let us suppose that only 60,000 men, whose hands are at present filled with the weapons of war, were turned to industry, and by encouragements and judicious regulations, kept at constant employment, the annual returns of profit arising from their several occupations would greatly exceed the sums granted by the public for their first establishment. Their industry also may be supposed perpetual; but the public charge on their account would be but of very short continuance. Besides, our government differs widely from that of arbitrary states. It not only like them extends its care to the defence of its subjects, but in a paternal manner exerts itself to promote the welfare of the meanest individuals. Our rulers, more particularly of late years, have distinguished themselves by their patriot zeal for promoting the interests of trade, and by the attention they have given to matters that concern the internal policy of the kingdom. In absolute governments, on the other hand, schemes of ambition are looked upon as the objects of greatest consideration, the splendor of the monarch, and the welfare of the people are frequently thought inconsistent with each other, and the latter

latter, on many occasions made to give way to the former *. As our legislative body are now happily freed from factious contests, and the advancing the prosperity of the nation, has of late seemed their unanimous study, I may, therefore, presume that the establishments I have proposed, both with regard to the fishery, the support of our marine, and the settlements for the discharged troops, if they should appear objects worthy of their consideration, would be zealously prosecuted by them, tho' the expence should be much higher than I have estimated it.

Great numbers of men, saved from wretchedness, and employed in virtuous industry, could not fail of adding considerably to the riches and power of the nation: but notwithstanding such a valuable acquisition, if our rulers do not now apply themselves to root out the base corruption that

* Of this we have a shocking instance in the barbarous policy of Lewis XIV. The forces of France, in the year 1709, were greatly exhausted, in consequence of the bad success of their arms, and the people were reduced to great misery by a famine, which then raged in several other kingdoms of Europe. The French generals, at the end of the campaign, gave in a list of the recruits that would be necessary for completing the armies for the ensuing spring. To their great surprize, however, the king issued no orders for raising those recruits, but commanded that care should be taken to fill his magazines with corn from Barbary and other places. A few months after he caused it to be given out every where that his troops had plenty of corn, and, in the mean while, having purposely neglected to alleviate the miseries of his subjects, the poor people, to save themselves from starving, entered into the service in great numbers; so that he had quickly many thousand recruits more than were necessary for completing his armies. In all probability, for every recruit he got by this means, two or three of his subjects miserably perished: his base flatterers, nevertheless, greatly applauded his refined policy, than which the annals of mankind can scarce furnish an instance of greater inhumanity.

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has so long prevailed in our monied system, all endeavours to secure the national prosperity will be blasted, and prove ineffectual. An enormous load of public debts is in the body politic like an abscess, or imposthume, lurking in the vital parts of the human body; it drains the nourishment from the active members, induces a consumptive habit, and at length, by a slow wasting of the strength, or, by a sudden bursting, generally puts a period to the life of the patient. None will deny, but, that we have felt decays; in consequence of the heavy incumbrance of our national debts, though from some favourable circumstances we have hitherto happily bore up under them; but I will give an instance where they have actually proved fatal to a most flourishing state, which at present is but a mere shadow of its antient splendor and power.

The republic of Genoa formerly carried on the greatest trade in Europe, had flourishing colonies in Tartary, maintained a most powerful naval force, and was the center of the greatest wealth in the western parts of the world. Those who peruse the history of that state may plainly perceive, that its declension is not owing, as is generally imagined, to the discovery of a new passage to the East Indies, which altered the channel of commerce; but to another cause, namely, to its imprudently mortgaging all its revenues to wealthy individuals, who, having politically got themselves formed into one company, immediately became masters of the republic *. The state
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Ad anno magistratus S. Georgii institutus est, atque altera prope respublica Genuam iuducta, ejus rei causa et origo hinc fuit. Cum assidua impendia in bellis ac classis, quæ armabantur,

thenceforth felt itself deprived of all vigour, and had no longer resources for carrying the smallest enterprize into execution, though, at the same time, the capital overflowed with wealth. The directors of the monied corporation, which took the name of *The Bank of St. George*, boldly becoming their own paymasters, by assuming the administration of the revenues of the State, influenced and swayed all public deliberations, and making the public interest give way to the interest of their funds, seized all opportunities of taking advantage of the distresses of the government, whereby trade quickly began to languish, and the country to be dispeopled. In a very short time commerce entirely vanished, and the republic, being thus deprived of its vital principle, was easily stripped of its foreign settlements, and sunk in a few years into a torpid, and inactive state, in which it has ever since continued, verifying the maxim of the historian Folleta, *mari adempto, omnia simul a Geniensibus adimi*. Had it not been for its domestic incumbrances, its commerce might still have flourished

mabantur, atque alia quæ tempora reipublicæ necessario postulabant, faciendæ essent, pecuniæ a privatis hominibus, deficientibus publicis, crebro mutua sumendæ erant, quibus, vectigalibus ipsis illis oppigneratis, cavebatur, fenusque ex ipsismet vectigalibus mutuatarum pecuniarum creditoribus persolvebatur, quod varium erat, caputque ipsum in portiones dividebatur, quas centenarum librarum esse placuit; ut qui mille libras mutuas dedisset, decem portiones in vectigalibus haberet, pro quibus singulis certum fenus anniversarium perciperet. Huic autem vectigali oppignerato certus numerus civium publice præficiæbatur; qui ratione crediti ac fructus vectigalium subducta, debitum fenus quotannis creditoribus cum fide persolveret. Ceterum cum res, alio super aliud vectigali deinceps oppignerato, ita egestate publica cogente, in immensum crevisset, singulisque vectigalibus oppigneratis certum numerum civium præfici necesse esset, tantaque multitudo confusionem

rished, notwithstanding the discovery of the passage by the Cape of Good Hope; for it is plain, the Genoese by equally convenient for sailing round Africa, as the English or Dutch. The English, by considering the progress and state of the Genoese funds, may plainly see their own in miniature; and, as they will find to a demonstration, that the bank of St. George has been the chief cause of the declension of that republic, it becomes them to reflect on the dangerous consequences attending the unknown credit of the bank of England, and the other monied companies.

The parallel between the state of the finances of that republic and of this nation, is, in many instances

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fusionem pareret, distracta hæc membra in unum corpus contracta, ac compacta sunt, cui octoviralis magistratus præfectus est, qui veteribus nominibus, quibus vectigalia inter se distinguebantur omisiss, S. Georgii appellatus est; jusque hoc illi additum, ut non jam publice ut antea eligeretur, sed a creditoribus tantummodo ac vectigalium oppigneratorum participibus quotannis crearetur, qui nulla in re rectoribus civitatis, ac prætorio subesset neque ab illis penderet, sed suas separatas ædes, suaque segregata consilia a republica haberet, consilioque universæ civitatis haudquaquam consulto, sed altero consilio, quod e participibus tantum constaret, convocato, de rebus suis pro arbitrio statueret, quodque statuisset jus esset, atque omnes participes teneret. Rectoresque civitatis ante initum magistratum ad iurjurandum adigerentur (id quod perpetuo servatum est) sese res S. Georgii non attacturos, neque quidquam de ejus juribus imminuturos. Hoc participum corpus alia ex alia necessitate bona publica oppignerandi indies exoriente, in immensum numerum crevit; ejusque dignitas et potentia majus robur indies assumpsit, insulæ Corsicæ, ac nonnullorum aliorum reipublicæ locorum imperio illi adjuncto; ut sic iisdem magni sæptis (res a nullis legislatoribus unquam excogitata ac nullis philosophorum disputationibus agitata) dux reipublicæ includantur; altera turbulenta ac discordiis civilibus, et seditionibus jactata et lacerata; altera quieta et pacata, incorruptos præcos mores retinens, rectique domi ac foris exempli. Vide Foliet, Hist. Gen. ad an. 1407. See the consequences of this most impolitic establishment, in the years 1453, 1487, and 1492.

instances but too conspicuous. The wealthy citizens of Genoa got themselves formed into one company, and obtained permission from their government to consolidate the debts of the republic, and to have the direction of the levying the taxes which were almost all consumed in paying the interest of their capital. In the year 1719, our rulers were so blind as to suffer a small body of men, under the name of the South Sea Company, to become the creditors of the public for no less a sum than 30 millions Sterling. If, to this sum, we add the public debts, bought up by another small body of men, named the Company of the Bank of England, we shall find a few wealthy individuals proprietors, not indeed of the whole national debt, but of more than two thirds of it, as it stood at that time. These men, instead of applying the wealth they were in possession of, to the generous purposes of advancing agriculture, commerce or manufactures, formed the base scheme of levying contributions on their fellow subjects, who were so unwary as to suffer them to put it in execution.

Our monied companies, 'tis true, have not, like that of Genoa, obtained the management of the public revenue; but have not the monied interest, and the landed interest long, with just reason, been looked upon as rival interests? Has not the influence of the monied interest been so great in parliament for many years past, as often to carry several points to the prejudice of the landed interest; and has it not even been acknowledged, that the ministry, for a long time past, have depended upon the monied men? Has not the dearth of commodities and the difficulty of living been greatly enhanced by the artificial increase of money, which is attended with all the bad consequences

quences of a real multiplication of gold and silver, without any of the substantial benefits that, in time of distress, might arise from the possession of those metals; and has not our foreign trade been cramped in consequence of the dearth of labour and provisions?

That our country, for several years past, has been dispeopling, partly by emigrations, but more particularly in consequence of the neglect of marriages and the prevailing fashion of celibacy, is confessed and lamented by many judicious and intelligent writers; and the decay of foreign commerce, and the expensiveness of living, are assigned as the causes of this. Happily, indeed, for us, our emigrants, instead of going like the Genoese into other countries, have only removed into a different part of our own dominions, where the fatal effects of the excessive multiplication of money is not known; and many foreigners having also taken up their residence in those parts, under the protection of our government, we have, by this new and unexpected resource, hitherto been enabled to bear up under our domestic incumbrances, and to maintain that rank among the European nations which is our due. As poison taken into the human body may sometimes, instead of killing, occasion an evacuation that may contribute to the health of the patient; in like manner our Stockholders, tho' the tendency of their schemes has been to exhaust and ruin the nation, have fortunately been instrumental in increasing its vigour.

But tho' poison should from a happy concurrence of circumstances for once fail in having its natural effect, would not he, who had thus luckily escaped, be looked upon as a madman if he should still risk the taking of large doses of it. Our trade

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to our colonies has hitherto fortunately supplied the loss of our commerce with foreign states in some measure; but nevertheless if we continue to accumulate our public debts, or neglect pursuing expedients for lessening them, the nation must unavoidably soon be debilitated. The artificial multiplication of our money enhancing the price of our manufactures, our colonists will, on that account, be in a manner compelled to supply themselves with those commodities made at home, which otherwise they would be inclined to take from us. Foreign nations, for the same reason, have of late turned our competitors in trade, and tho' they may not at first be so skilful as we are, yet the cheapness of labour with them, will in the end turn the ballance in their favour, unless we pursue such measures as may render it easy for our labouring people to procure a subsistence, and consequently to work for less wages. The report of higher wages being given in England than in any other kingdom in Europe, will be far from retaining our manufacturers, or increasing their number by the acquisition of foreigners; but will have quite a contrary effect; for the abundance of money in any place is not such a bait to draw new settlers, as the easiness of earning a subsistence. More people go to our colonies in North America, where 'tis said they may support themselves without money, merely by the products of the earth, than are tempted to go to Barbadoes, where the wages of workmen is seven or eight shillings a day. Should the commercial competition of our European neighbours prove successful, and a spirit of emigrating seize our manufacturers, what would our boasted abundance of wealth signify, especially as it is not of the genuine kind, like the hoards of gold and silver belonging to the East India

India Nabobs, but is mere treasures of paper without any intrinsic value. As the plain tendency of the excessive multiplication of wealth is to obstruct population, and to render the baneful influence of luxury more universal, wise rulers, who wish the permanent stability of a state, ought to guard against it as watchfully as against a foreign invader. What then must have been the ignorance or knavery of those ministers, who suffered our monied corporations to open upon us a mine of imaginary riches by which they, as proprietors, made sometimes twenty per cent. while the rest of their fellow subjects, and the public itself, were thereby so encumbered and distressed that the nation must have been quickly ruined, had not its trade and connections been daily increasing with a flourishing part of its subjects settled on the continent and islands of America.

But let us take a more particular view of the pernicious effects of our artificial wealth, and of the distresses which the nation has suffered, and the dangers which threaten it in consequence of this imaginary affluence. According to the computation of our most judicious writers on commerce, our circulating coin, including even foreign specie, does not exceed seventeen millions sterling*. The currency of paper at the same time, including our national debts, amounts to no less than 350 millions*, that is, for every pound we

* The author does not here mean that this whole quantity of paper is in actual circulation, like single guineas and shillings; but that we have created such a sum of paper signs of wealth which are called *current*, because they may be hoarded or transferred, according to the fancy of the proprietor, with as much ease and dispatch as real money. Lands and houses, on the other hand, are not the signs of wealth but real wealth themselves, and cannot be transferred without the signing of deeds, and many tedious formalities.

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have in gold and silver we have upwards of twenty pounds in paper. Our circulating coin in gold and silver before the beginning of this century was said to have amounted to fifteen millions; so that notwithstanding our flourishing trade for these seventy years past, the quantity of our real specie has but increased two millions; nay some very judicious writers allege, that it has not increased half a million. That the balance of our trade, since the revolution, has brought in many millions of gold and silver is an undoubted truth; but the people of this island, instead of being possessors of greater quantities of those precious metals now, than at the former period, have actually been stripped, without their perceiving it, of all the real specie they were then in possession of, as they are become debtors to foreign nations for the whole of it, and for many millions besides. Such have been the pernicious consequences of funding and jobbing. Cæsar, in his account of the ancient Britons, says, that they had no gold and silver money among them, and the same with the greatest truth may be said of the modern Britons, were our foreign creditors to be faithfully and honestly paid that part of the national debt owing to them, which on the lowest computation, is supposed to amount to near thirty millions. We should not, 'tis true, even in this case, be wholly without gold and other precious effects; for it is computed by some that the bullion, plate, and diamonds in the nation, exclusive of other rich commodities, amount to the value of twenty millions sterling, tho' by others they are not estimated so high. But had we not most imprudently suffered interested men to multiply upon us imaginary riches, the quantity of our bullion, plate, diamonds, &c. must necessarily have been by this time much greater than

than it is, even tho' the ballance of trade in our favour since the revolution, had been one half less than it has been computed; and none will deny but that treasures of this kind in reserve are infinitely preferable to those of paper, which threaten us every moment with some violent convulsion. Had the issue of the war been as unfavourable to us as it has been to the French (and that it has happened otherwise, has apparently been more owing to the favour of Providence than to any superiority of our natural strength) in all probability our public credit would have failed before this time, and the consequences of our bankruptcy would have been much more fatal to us, than what followed among the French upon their bankruptcy, was to them. Their large hoards of plate turned into circulation by the mint, in some measure, supplied the deficiency of their coin, which was not artificially increased by a large paper currency; whereas our plate, tho' turned to the same purposes, would bear but a very small proportion in supplying the general deficiency that would be felt, upon the sudden annihilation of all our paper money; and what would be the distress of the nation in such circumstances is easier to be conceived than expressed. A ship that is wholly composed of sound timbers may be stranded and got off again with little damage; but a vessel which for every sound timber has ten or a dozen rotten ones will no sooner strike on a bank than she will break to pieces.

But supposing that the hazard of a bankruptcy should be very remote, are not the inconveniencies arising from the national debt so very considerable as to call aloud for the reforming hand of the legislature? The excessive abundance of imaginary specie has had the effect of an actual increase

of real wealth, by altering the proportion that formerly subsisted between merchandize and money. Thus the price of all commodities has been enhanced, which has distressed individuals, cramped the national trade, and lessened the exertive vigour of the state; for the same taxes cannot now perform the same services as formerly, since many articles of consumption have crept up to more than double their former prices.

The interest paid by the nation annually to our stockholders exceeds three millions sterling, which is more than five shillings in the pound of the computed rent of all the lands in England; thus the landed gentlemen find themselves encumbered with a mortgage upon their estates of more than one fourth of their yearly income. The additional expences of the state during a war, have sometimes not much exceeded three millions, so that considering these three millions of interest, raised upon the people, and paid into the pockets of private persons, as a subsidy almost sufficient for the support of a war, the nation has in a manner been carrying on two wars at once. And, indeed, it is evident that the greatest enemies we have had during this war are ourselves, or rather our stockholders; for supposing the public were at liberty to use the three millions appropriated for the payment of their interest as supplies for a war, and the prices of our manufactures were lessened in consequence of the annihilation of the greatest part of our paper money, the nation would with a very little exertion be able to raise almost all the supplies within the year, and in this case could have carried on such a war as the present for twenty years, and prospered under it. But we could not with the same success contend against our monied men; for if the war had continued

two or three years longer, and our arms had still been successful against our foreign enemies, the nation nevertheless would have been so exhausted by its domestic enemies, that we should have been obliged to conclude a peace upon any terms with the former, to get some respite from the dangerous encroachments made upon the national property by the latter.

The Dutch carried on a war with the powerful Spanish monarchy for forty years; but having no superfluity of artificial wealth to check their industry at home, and estimating the charge of the war, for the most part, according to their abilities, they annually increased in strength and vigour, and at length obliged their once formidable enemy to grant them an honourable peace. Lewis XII. of France was engaged in war during his whole reign, a period of no less than seventeen years, yet left no incumbrances upon his people at his death. Edward III. of England carried on very expensive wars both at home and abroad, during a great part of his long and glorious reign; yet such was the wisdom of the maxims he pursued in regard to the domestic policy of his kingdom, that his subjects having no heavy subsidies to pay to private companies, were able to furnish annually the large supplies necessary for the support of the state, the trade of the nation at the same time flourishing in a greater degree than it ever had done before in any period. In those days it would seem that the public's real ability was made the measure of the national expence, and that private men were not suffered to prey upon the people's industry, by claiming interest for loans of imaginary wealth. Were not the revenues of the nation at present so deeply mortgaged, we should need no other resources, besides the annual

supplies that might be raised upon the public to enable us to set the utmost efforts of the French at defiance. Considering the present unanimity and vigorous strength of the nation, and the warm and zealous affection of all ranks to our patriot king, an invasion from the French could not be more formidable to us now, than the famous armada of Philip II. was to England alone in the glorious reign of Elizabeth. The views of our monied men, however, since they have felt the sweets of trafficking with the government, have been to divert the nation from exerting itself according to its real and natural strength, and to persuade us to measure the extent of our power by the extent of our credit. They have professed themselves devoted to the ministry, and cloaking their interested designs with that honourable pretence, they have been always forward to supply the wants of the public by the way of a loan, which has been the fatal cause of that facility the nation has met with in plunging itself into debt, and lavishing its real wealth in the most profuse and inconsiderate manner.

For these many years past immense subsidies in time of war, and considerable ones in time of peace, have been paid by us to foreign potentates, which subsidies if they were all to be reckoned up in one sum, would be double or triple the amount of the whole gold and silver coin in the nation. If the ballance of our trade, during this period, had been so great as to have supplied those large sums with some remaining overplus for ourselves, such a diversion of our superfluous wealth would have been no detriment to the state, as we should thereby have been freed from the inconveniencies attending a too great abundance of money, and would have still had a quantity of real coin sufficient

cient for all the purposes of commerce. But that we have given away to our foreign allies, and spent in foreign connections, not the exuberances of our wealth, but actually more than the whole of it, is evident from this, that the debt we at present owe to foreigners exceeds the total amount of our gold and silver coin by several millions.

An opinion, however, has been industriously propagated, that the largeness of the sums we borrow is a proof of our riches, as they are furnished to the state chiefly by our own subjects, and to have individuals, who, from the exuberance of the profits of trade, can supply the government one year with seven millions, another year with ten, and another with twelve, &c. at the low interest of three or four per cent. is a certain proof that we are the most wealthy nation in the universe. But if we consider this scheme of money lending a little more narrowly, we shall find that our large loans are not so much a proof of our wealth, as of our fondness for building upon the airy foundation of credit, and having recourse to expeditious resources, suggested from mercenary views. Those who are most concerned in real commerce traffic least with the public; yet 'tis pretended that the sums lent to the government are paid in hard money, and arise from the annual profits of trade, great part of which profits, in some miraculous manner, come into the possession of a set of no-merchants, who are distinguished by the title of the monied men. Suppose even one half of the trade of the nation were carried on by these monied men, if their profits in three or four years could amount to thirty millions, the profits of our whole trade would be sixty millions, which allowing 12 per cent. on an average for the gain of the trade would have required the stock to have
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amounted to the value of no less than 500 millions. The bare mention of the extent of trade required to raise these pretended profits, is a sufficient demonstration of the absurdity of such a supposition. Nay, if instead of twenty or thirty monied men, undertaking to supply the Government with 12 millions, all the thriving men of the kingdom, should agree to lend their annual savings to the state, it is evident, that the aggregate of the whole would not make the sum of 12 millions.

The plenty of our money then, is not the fund that supplies our loans to the government, but the abundance of something else, which custom has made fashionable to be taken for money; and the privilege of coining this artificial specie, is monopolized by a small number of men, to the detriment of the whole community. The practice of borrowing and funding, which has been repeated year after year, during the course of our four last wars, has gradually drained the nation of more than its whole stock of gold and silver in specie, notwithstanding the recruits we have received from the large balance of our active trade; and has distressed us with a superfluous abundance of nominal wealth, which, by enhancing the expence of living, has raised the price of our manufactures, and consequently lessened the sale of them.

Our paper-money being multiplied upon us without ceasing, soon drove gold and silver out of the large transactions in trade, and, in these, their absence was not much felt, as bills were found of easier and readier conveyance, and the knavish art of dealing in bills without any fund not being then invented, all bills, in circulation, were supposed to have an equivalent in gold and silver,

or in commodities lodged somewhere. The real specie being thus turned to the daily and weekly circulation, in small affairs, the nation seemed to overflow with a general abundance of it; but the prices of things thereupon advancing, more of it became necessary, to purchase the same quantity of commodities, and immense sums, at the same time, being still sent out of the kingdom, and their place supplied with more paper, small bills at length began to make their appearance, in minute payments, and in the lesser transactions of traffic; and of late, it is a common complaint, that real specie, with the utmost difficulty, can be found to answer those bills*. To divert the general murmuring, and lull our suspicions, we are told, that it is the wicked Jews, who export great part of our silver, on account of the profit they make by exchanging it for gold; and that another great part of it is hoarded by the bank, to enable them to ward off any large and sudden demand. But whether this fully accounts for the almost total want of small specie in circulation, and for the scarcity of gold as well as silver, I leave it to any readers of common sagacity to determine. Our money-lenders have treated the nation in the same manner as Dr. Sangrado treated his patients; they have drained off all its blood, and supplied the place of that vital fluid with plenty of water, and, though the state has been far from prospering, in consequence of their prescriptions, their fees have nevertheless been

* A letter a few months ago, from Birmingham, mentions, that cash, both gold and silver, is so scarce there, that they are obliged to take two and a half *per cent.* discount, for very good bills within a fortnight of being due; and even to allow a discount, of one half *per cent.* to get change for bank notes.

most unconscionable. In former times they have been reckoned at 40 and 30 *per cent*; but of late years, they have sunk considerably, though they are still too burdensom for an exhausted state to bear.

As it is the good faith of the parliament alone, that supports the credit of our monied companies, why should the legislative power be diffident of its own credit upon its own bottom, by which the commonwealth might be supported without the assistance of those quacks, who assume the name of monied men. Why may not the parliament, in case of need, instead of borrowing the credit of others, issue bills upon its own credit, which bills would be equally convenient in domestic traffic, as those of private men, and might easily circulate in the nation to a great amount, if there was money deposited at an office, under their direction, to be always ready to answer any occasional demands.

Besides the inconveniences already mentioned, flowing from the abundance of our imaginary wealth, there is another, the secret, though fatal influence of which seems hitherto to have been in a great measure overlooked. The excessive dearness of labour, commodities, and provisions, in this kingdom, is attributed to the great number of our taxes, which, it is said, have so raised the price of all our manufactures, as to diminish the sale of them among foreign nations. Now, I doubt not but upon reflection it will appear, that the high price of every thing, is not so much owing to our numerous taxes, as to our seeming plenty of money; and that, if the greatest part of our artificial specie were annihilated, manufactures, labour, and provisions, would become much cheaper than they are at present, and the nation

nation could still raise the same taxes without being more burdened than they are now. If money, or the signs of money, are in great plenty in a state, it sinks in value, in proportion to that plenty. If we look back a little more than 200 years *, we shall find our kings meeting with as much difficulty then, in raising 10,000 pounds, as now in raising a million, such was the scarcity of gold and silver in Europe, before the Spaniards had conquered the West Indies and Peru. The small quantity, however, the princes had of those metals, served all the purposes of our present abundance; they carried on great undertakings, and engaged in long and obstinate wars, if not without burdening, yet, at least, without exhausting their subjects.

The whole taxes raised, during the 44 years of the reign of Elizabeth, are said, not to have exceeded 6 millions; but, in those days, many burdensome and expensive military services, were performed by the counties, and by private persons, and the charges of them not reckoned in the national estimate; yet probably, (as there was then no standing army, and the royal navy was but inconsiderable) the last kind of expences were as high as those estimated in parliament. Besides, the land revenue of that Queen, exclusive of the wards and dutchy of Lancaster, amounted to 188,197 *l.* 4 *s.* *per annum*, which, in 44 years, makes 8,280,676 *l.* 16 *s.* so that the whole charges of government, during that reign, may be reckoned above 20 millions. This appears a small sum in comparison of the taxes, that have been raised these 44 years past in Great Britain; yet if the observations of the celebrated Montesquieu

* See the reign of Henry VII.

are just, the real disproportion betwixt the sums raised in the two different periods will not be very considerable. It was not long, he says, after the conquest of Mexico and Peru, before the specie of Europe was doubled; this appeared from the price of commodities which every where was doubled. As the specie of Europe doubled, the profit of Spain diminished in the same proportion, and they had every year the same quantity of metals, which was become by one half less precious. In double the time the specie still doubled, and the profit still diminished another half. If we proceed thus doubling and doubling, we shall find, in this progression, the cause and impotency of the wealth of Spain. It is about 200 years since they began to work their Indian mines, and I suppose the quantity of the specie at present, in the trading world, is to that before the discovery of the Indies, as 32 to 1; that is, it has been doubled five times. In 200 years more, the same quantity will be to that before the discovery, as 64 to 1; that is, it will be doubled once more". *l'Esprit de Loix* l. 21.

Montesquieu speaks of the real specie; but if we include also the nominal coin, by which the quantity of our money is seemingly increased, this nation may be accounted 50 times more wealthy now, than it was in the days of Elizabeth. In this case, considering the proportionable value of the different sums, the taxes raised, during that reign, were as chargeable to England, as all the taxes that have been raised these 44 years past have been to Great Britain. It is of the greatest importance to a state to have plenty of money; but, it is likewise extremely prejudicial to it, to have twice or thrice as much as all its neighbours. If
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the quantity of specie in Europe, in general, is to that before the discovery of the Indies, as 32 to 1; we might very well content ourselves to have the quantity of specie, in this island, as 40 to 1; and if our circulating specie were reduced to that proportion, by the annihilation of the greatest part of our paper money, the nation, supposing it disincumbred of its debts, could raise as great taxes as the present, without being burdened so much as it now is, in consequence of the most impolitic practice of borrowing and funding. The successes and advantages of a war, lose much of their solidity, while we bring upon ourselves a yearly debt, higher than all the revenues of all our conquests. I question not, but that Edward III. or Queen Elizabeth, would have looked upon victories purchased in such a manner, as real defeats.

During this war there has been added to the national currency upwards of 30 millions of paper specie, which has rendered our money seemingly more plentiful, and consequently lessened its value in the same degree; and there has been likewise added a million to our taxes. The first of these incumbrances, though generally overlooked, is almost as heavy as the second; and both of them are for a perpetuity unless redeemed. Now, to consider the increase of the taxes alone, one million in perpetuity, it must be acknowledged, is a much heavier burden, than even three or four millions of extraordinary supplies, raised during the continuance of a war, and ceasing entirely upon a peace. But, instead of one million, our passion for borrowing, which has been fatally nursed by our monied men, has at length burdened us with more than three millions in perpetuity. If the nation had exerted itself in an extraordinary

manner, during the short continuance of a war, the public, at this day, would not have been burdened with these three millions; but, by falsely aiming at making the burden of a war be little felt, we have, at length, burdened ourselves with the expence of a perpetual war. But even supposing the public could easily afford to raise the sums necessary, for discharging the yearly interest of the debts; the disposing of such immense sums in that manner, is nevertheless extremely prejudicial to the kingdom. How different would be the state of the nation, if these three millions, that are paid annually to stockholders, to support them without industry, were bestowed as bounties to further the advancement of our manufactures?

Can any good reason be assigned, why our lawgivers ought not to establish it, as a law to themselves, to make the present abilities of the people, the measure of the national expence? or, if they should borrow an inconsiderable part of it in time of war, why they should not continue the taxes, during peace, till that part be wholly cleared off? To issue a million of artificial specie, during a war, would not be attended with much inconvenience, as trade, which at that time meets with many incumbrances, requires some artificial resources to give it fresh vigour; but, till that debt is cleared off, there is a necessity for continuing the taxes even during a peace.

To anticipate our revenues, to prevent other potentates from anticipating theirs, is a most romantic strain of generosity. We have, in consequence of many engagements involved ourselves in a debt of, at least, 40 millions, in serving the house of Austria; but, has that family contracted such a heavy debt, in serving itself? The territories

ritories of that august house have, more than once, been protected, by the treasures and blood of Britons. We have saved its towns, and prevented it from mortgaging its revenue, by mortgaging our own; yet we cannot prodnce any returns of gratitude or acknowledgement, unless we think ourselves, in some measure, repaid by a letter of the Empress to our late magnanimous king, thanking him for exposing his life in her service. Queen Elizabeth, for the assistance she gave the Dutch, laid them under an obligation of returning some solid acknowledgement, by stipulating, to keep possession of four or five of their chief towns, till she should be reimbursed the charge she had been at on their account. In all probability, the French have acted in the same manner in their present alliance with Austria, and have taken the towns in Flanders, as a deposit for the subsidies they should be obliged to give to the Empress. Allowing that the wants of our allies are sometimes so very pressing, as to render it necessary for us, to pay pecuniary subsidies to them in time of war, prudence, however, would dictate, that if we must borrow those sums ourselves, the prince we give them to, ought to become bound, at least, for the interest of them. When we borrow money, we are obliged to mortgage part of our revenues to pay the annual interest; and if we can raise large sums by that means, could not our German allies, in the necessity of their affairs, have done the same by mortgaging the revenues of Moravia, of part of Flanders, of East Friesland, or of any other province, which would have obliged them, instead of sticking to us like bloodsuckers, to have been good managers, and to have bridled their ambition, till they had redeemed those pledges. The
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mortgaging of taxes, and the mortgaging of provinces comes to the same thing in the end; for by our continued borrowing and funding, what else have we done than mortgaged the richest province of the British empire, namely the county of Middlesex, the whole revenues of which, including those of the capital city, are not sufficient to pay the yearly interest of the public debts. While we are so very generous as not to scruple new and larger mortgages every succeeding year, to raise such subsidies as should prevent our allies from mortgaging any of their territories, it is no wonder that their rapacity should rise in the same proportion as our generosity. The demands of our allies could not have been so immoderate as we have felt them to be, if they had been once convinced that our rulers had made it a law to themselves, to limit the annual national expence to the real abilities of the people, and if their indolence, ambition, and extravagance* had not been fed by us, in all probability they would, on many occasions, have exerted themselves more, or been less refractory in agreeing to reasonable terms of peace.

The public debts are productive of another great evil to the state. The usurious profits of the money-lenders having been repeated without mea-

* The Imperialists in 1702, undertook the siege of Landau; but their army was so ill supplied, that they were obliged to suspend the military operations some weeks, for want of ammunition, the money which ought to have furnished the necessities of the siege, having been expended in providing a magnificent equipage and retinue for the king of the Romans, who came in a great parade to the camp to have the honour of taking the place. The subsidies the Imperialists received from us no doubt encouraged them to squander their treasure in that vain and needless pomp, which is said to have thrown all their affairs into disorder.

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sure, have concentrated a great part of the national wealth into the hands of a few men, who by their suddenly acquired fortunes promote the growth of luxury in the capital where they generally reside, while in the remote parts of the kingdom, trade languishes for want of a sufficient circulation. The perpetual fluctuation of the funds is like a market where the price of things is perpetually varying, and as this fluctuation is chiefly influenced by the tricks and false alarms of the money-jobbers, it affords a fine field for their knavery to exercise itself in, by buying at an under-rate and selling at an exorbitant profit. Thus great part of the national wealth, which ought to be employed in trade, is diverted from that channel of honest industry, and used in an usurious traffic; a traffic which preys upon the profits of the industrious. The distribution of the wealth of a state in a just measure, is as necessary to its prosperity, as the proper distribution of the blood is to the health of the human body; but the riches of this nation cannot be said to be duly distributed, when a few men, without following commerce, or carrying on large manufactures, acquire immense estates, while, on the other hand, the number of those who are supported by public charity daily increases. 'Tis computed we have about seventeen millions of real specie in this island, and near eight millions of inhabitants, which is about two pounds for each individual. Supposing one million of the inhabitants, or one eighth of the whole, to be possessed of one half of the national wealth, and the other half to be divided among the remaining seven millions of people, the state might perhaps feel no inconvenience from this distribution, but however it might be, 'tis plain that its condition would be much worse if 200,000,

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or one fortieth of the inhabitants should acquire the possession of three fourths of the national wealth. Our money-lenders, however, by their artifices have increased the inequality to a still higher degree. The number of the public creditors or stockholders is supposed not to exceed 17,000, yet this small number of persons, among whom must be several foreigners, are proprietors of upwards of an hundred millions sterling, which is more than one fourth of the whole national currency in specie and paper united. Our monied men in consequence of their successful engrossing so large a proportion of the national wealth, have, since the beginning of this century, been regarded by those in power as the chief pillars of the state; and of late years they have affected a kind of priority in respect of the landed gentlemen, who by many are now reckoned only in the secondary class of subjects. The monied interest in parliamentary contests, has already often shewn itself to be the prevalent interest, many of the landed gentlemen being so far seduced, as to betray their own cause, and zealously to support the interested schemes of their worst enemies. As our monied men also have long had access to the ministers of state, it may be questioned whether, during a corrupt administration, they have not swayed the national councils, so as to render them subservient to their private views. Supposing all our monied companies united into one, which 'tis said, was once in agitation, their influence would no doubt increase; and as views of profit might render them the tools of a ministry, they would, in that case, under a prince of a despotic temper, be more dangerous instruments in enslaving a nation than a numerous army of mercenary troops. As vigour and unanimity are now restored to our national

national councils, and we have a king who has already manifested the integrity of his disposition, by expressing his disapprobation of governing by unconstitutional means, we could not certainly wish for a more favourable conjuncture to cease enlarging our public debts, and to think of effectual expedients for lessening them.

To conclude, it is universally allowed that a nation never flourishes while the property of all the lands is engrossed by a few great men, which is generally the case in infant states; but its prosperity is equally blasted when the money is engrossed by a few, more especially when those few reside in one spot, and have no interest or connections in the remote parts of the kingdom. That wise and politic prince Henry VII. laid the foundation of our present liberties and grandeur, by breaking the land monopolies, and I doubt not but from what has been said, it will appear that there is as urgent a necessity at this time for putting a check to the monopolizers of our specie.

To some, who have never thoroughly examined the dangerous consequences of our national debts, the present extensiveness of our trade appears an infallible demonstration, that our affairs are in a most prosperous condition, and that we have nothing to fear from our internal incumbrances, since we actually find that they do not hinder new channels of wealth from daily opening to us. I shall bestow a few words in shewing the fallacy of this conclusion. As the general consumption of all the nations in Europe, and the colonies depending upon them, may be supposed to remain about its usual extent, the increase of our trade will be chiefly owing to the decrease of the trade of other states, or to some forced circulation at home. Let us consider what nations have in-

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creased their commerce, or formed such establishments as tend to increase it, and what states have lost part of the trade they formerly possessed. The trade of the Turks and Italians may be supposed neither more nor less vigorous or languid, than it has been for many years past; only we find some efforts to promote trade in Sicily by the establishment of a chamber of commerce at Messina in 1751. The trade of the Spaniards is allowed to have increased very considerably since the commencement of this war; and as a commercial spirit is beginning to prevail in that nation, they are likely, not only to retain what they have acquired, but also to augment it. The French, who, before the war, had an extensive commerce, a most flourishing fishery, and a great number of ships, have been intirely stripped of their fishery, and have lost almost all their ships; but it would doubtless be forming too hasty a conclusion to affirm that their trade is entirely ruined, and that the means of re-establishing it are irretrievably cut off. Their wines, their cambrics, &c. find their way even into this island notwithstanding the war; and what interruption, can the Danes, the Dutch, the Spaniards, the Swedes, Russians, &c. meet with in carrying home goods bought in France not contraband, to their respective countries. The French inland trade to Germany, Spain, Italy, and Holland, which is very considerable, cannot in the least be interrupted by our cruisers. Doubtless the French are great sufferers in the loss of their fishery, in the loss of their shipping, which deprives them of the advantage of freightage, and in the loss of Guadaloupe, Canada, &c. but as their country has not been the seat of war, it would be unreasonable to suppose that their internal trade had been wholly interrupted. According to their
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own writers, *la Bagatelle est le resource des François*; their trade in toys alone is of great importance to them. But allowing the diminution of their trade to be exceeding great, it can only be looked upon as temporary; for we may as well suppose that the trees, which have no leaves in winter will never sprout again, as imagine that the French, who have great numbers of expert manufacturers, and most prudent regulations for the conducting of commerce, will not quickly recover a very considerable trade, if their commodities are offered to market cheaper than ours. Tho' they should not for the future be allowed to fish in the American seas, yet if we indolently neglect the fishery on our own coasts, which might prove to us a most fruitful nursery of hardy sailors, we may perhaps in a few years see the coasts of Iceland crouded with French fishing vessels, in consequence of a treaty between them and the king of Denmark. It may then be allowed that the war has been extremely detrimental to the French trade; but it must also be granted that their commerce is far from being plucked up by the roots, and that it will undoubtedly revive again upon the return of a peace. As Germany has been miserably harassed for these five years past by numerous armies, its trade and manufactures must consequently be greatly diminished; but its imperial cities being in a manner unconnected with the quarrel of the princes, and some provinces having but slightly felt the miseries of the war, trade, in all probability, has been carried on more briskly than usual in these last exempted places, as the immense sums of gold and silver sent thither to support the troops, would greatly quicken the demand for their manufactures. At the return of a peace, therefore, many German merchants

will be in possession of large sums, which will gradually circulate thro' the country, and soon restore their trade to its former ballance. Our trade in the mean time has doubtless gained by the decay of theirs, and that of the French; but it has received no augmentation at the expence of the Dutch or the Danes, for the commerce of both these nations, as well as of the Spaniards, has been enlarged since the breaking out of the war. If the Swedes and Russians have not greatly increased their trade, yet they have formed such regulations as tend to enlarge it at our expence, by encouraging the establishment of new manufactures of various kinds. In Russia particularly they have begun to carry on several manufactures of woollen cloth; and a few months ago we find that a new council of commerce was instituted at Petersburg. The devastations in Germany, the conquest of the French colonies, and the loss of their shipping are then, in respect of other nations, the chief causes of our present increased trade, but these are merely temporary, excepting that arising from the conquests which shall be retained by us at the peace.

The present increase of our trade, however, is more owing to some causes operating within ourselves, than to any great diminution of the trade of France and Germany, and these causes also must cease at a peace. The large sums of money carried out to America, to supply the exigences of the war on that continent, have occasioned more than an ordinary consumption and circulation among our colonists, and consequently increased their demands for the manufactures and commodities of the mother country; but when the war is concluded, this channel in a great measure will be shut up. The materials for our land
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and naval armaments are extremely expensive, and so far as they are raised and fabricated at home, they give employment to great numbers of manufacturers, and increase our internal traffic; but so far as we are obliged to purchase them of the Swedes or Russians, the commerce, tho' it may occasion some stir, can scarcely be called advantageous. However great our internal trade may be in consequence of the demand for warlike stores of all kinds; yet 'tis evident that when the war ceases that must also cease. The last extraordinary source of our increased trade, and which indeed is the primary fountain from whence all the other sources are supplied, is the annual multiplication of our paper money in consequence of the loans to the government. This source from which we have drawn imaginary millions yearly will be entirely shut up at the peace, and it is for the benefit of the nation that it should be so; for tho' in times of necessity it gives a temporary relief, yet its remote effects are sure to occasion great languor and weakness, if we do not anticipate them by a speedy recourse to the natural means of subsistence. This artificial support is like lime laid to the root of a tree, which by such cultivation may for two or three years yield plentiful forced crops, but if the lime were to be annually augmented, the tree instead of prospering would wither and die, tho' it might have lived for ages, if it had been supplied with nourishment that was natural to it. The Spaniards when their plate fleets brought them home annually several millions of silver from America, no doubt rejoiced greatly at the increase of their specie, which served as a fund for the expences of their ambitious princes, and enabled private persons to turn greater consumers, that is, to purchase greater quantities of all kinds of foreign

reign commodities, and to live in an idle and luxurious manner. Those who did not consider distant consequences, probably concluded that their nation was becoming every day more formidable, and would soon be able to give law to all Europe; but the event quickly shewed that the rapid increase of their wealth had only served to exhaust and enervate them. If two or three millions of silver flowing in annually upon the Spaniards without any exertion of industry on their part, proved in the end extremely prejudicial to them, ought not we to be alarmed at the annual influx of three or four millions of artificial specie, which as to its remote effects deadens trade, while at the same time it gives fresh vigour to luxury. During a war indeed it might be allowable to issue annually one million of artificial specie to prevent the stagnation of trade which then meets with many obstructions; but as has already been mentioned, the taxes ought not to be lessened during a peace, till the incumbrance contracted during the war be entirely cleared off, otherwise any advantage that accrued from it to the state, will be overbalanced by the detriment received from it afterwards.

The chief causes of our increased trade appearing to be all temporary, and some of them even to be of a hurtful tendency, its present vigour would seem but a weak foundation for boasting of the nation's prosperity, while we find most of our European neighbours daily establishing new manufactures, and barring the entrance of ours into their dominions by unfriendly prohibitions, and some even by peremptory exclusions.

If we continue inattentive to the fatal consequences of the heavy national incumbrances, which have greatly enhanced the prices of our manufactures, and consequently encouraged foreigners
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to rival us ; if no means are thought of for promoting the nation's solid interest, by putting a bit in the mouths of our money-mongers ; by easing the people of the annual tribute they pay to private persons ; by turning their views to such methods of advancing their fortunes as are consistent with the public welfare, and by countenancing those who have the boldness to stem the tide of corruption and venality, our present puffy greatness, however flattering its appearance, may justly be compared to the shewy splendor of a soap bubble, and may quickly be succeeded by a most enervating debility.

The present vigorous exertion of the nation, I allow, seems far from boding such a reverse of fortune ; but a state as well as a human body, by presuming too far upon its activity and over-exerting its natural strength, may contract a most dangerous distemper, tho' the effects of that distemper may not appear till a considerable time after the cause operated. The Spaniards in the reign of their monarch Philip II. astonished all Europe with their affluence, their numerous and well disciplined armies, and their most formidable fleets ; and who, in those days, would have believed that such a display and exertion of strength was a prelude to almost two centuries of languor and weakness ; yet such we have found it has actually proved.

The French during the long period of the reign of Lewis XIV. had raised their power and greatness to such a degree, as singly to dispute the sovereignty of the sea with the two most formidable naval powers of Europe united, and to baffle the utmost efforts of many powerful states leagued against them. But their ambitious monarch having a pride in enlarging his territories, without

even reckoning on the expence either of blood or treasure, went on augmenting the charges of his government, increasing his armies, and accumulating his debts, till at length he exhausted the natural strength of his dominions, and introduced as much misery into his kingdom as if it had been ravaged by a victorious enemy. His dominions being enlarged with some new acquisitions of territory, and numerous armies being maintained in the field by him to the last, the misery of his kingdom was only looked upon as temporary; and it was generally concluded that the French in consequence of his conquests had established their power more firmly than ever. Their misery so far as it regarded a want of subsistence among the poorer sort was indeed only temporary; and it may be allowed that no people recruit might misfortunes more speedily than the French; but the excessive destruction of men, and waste of treasure, the great diminution of trade, and the incumbrances upon the state in consequence of the anticipation of its revenues, and the great number of placemen and annuitants, sunk the whole kingdom into difficulties and distresses, which have at length so weakened and enervated them, that at this day they are not able to bear the expence of naval armaments, and cannot even support land expeditions in such a manner as to render them formidable to one state, much less to a grand alliance.

As the heavy incumbrances brought upon the Spaniards and French by the impolitic ambition of Philip II. and Lewis XIV. have been the chief causes of the present debility of those kingdoms, have not we the justest reason to dread the consequences of our enormous encumbrances, especially as they are larger in proportion to the greatness

ness of this state, than those which exhausted the strength of France and Spain.

The nation seems arrived at a most interesting crisis, and probably peace will either soon introduce languor and decay, in consequence of the commercial rivalry of all our neighbours, or if care is taken to ease us at home, we shall see more vigorous exertions than ever in every part of the island, and not only new manufactures established, but new lands brought into cultivation, and new buildings carried on in all our cities and towns. The heavy national debts plainly threaten us with the former; but when we reflect that we are at present blessed with a virtuous king, and an uncorrupt and strenuous administration, we have the greatest reason to expect the latter, especially as expedients now offer themselves for clearing off the public debts, which would have been impracticable sixty years ago; and Britain, since its colonies are become so populous and extensive, may be regarded as the head of a vast empire, which can subsist and be very powerful without depending solely upon the precarious support of foreign commerce.

While England was more burdened than profited by its American colonies, and was straitened on the North by the rival kingdom of Scotland, the chief source of its wealth and power consisted in its advantageous traffic with foreign nations. But as Great Britain now forms one united state, and its colonies are not only a ready market for its manufactures, but also supply us abundantly with a great variety of commodities, which we formerly purchased from other nations, foreign commerce is now less necessary, and the most solid means of promoting our future aggrandizement, would be to give the greatest encourage-

ment to population and industry. The two large and fruitful islands of Britain and Ireland could support more than double the number of their present inhabitants; and besides, Britons may now live in America adjoining to Britons, as secure from a foreign enemy as in an island, for an extent of upwards 2000 miles.

The apprehensions of some, that if we suffer our colonies to spread over North America, they will soon shake off their dependance upon their mother country, seem weak and groundless. On the contrary, as the judicious author of *the interest of great Britain considered with regard to her colonies* observes, the wider we spread our colonies, on that continent, there is the less reason to fear their being disunited from us. While they enjoy the same liberties and privileges as other Britons; we need not apprehend a universal confederacy, and it would not be the interest of any one colony to be disunited from the British Empire, or of the others to suffer such a dismemberment. The different governments are mutual checks upon each other; if we shall therefore form two or three colonies on the Ohio and Mississippi, we thereby add so many new pledges for securing the fidelity of the whole. That the immediate interest of any single colony should be subservient to the interest of G. Britain, could afford no just cause of murmuring or discontent, as this would only be making the interest of a part give way to the interest of the whole; and in this island, we often find private persons obliged to sell part of their property to accommodate the public. The desire of having a capital city among them, could hardly be a temptation to the colonists to revolt, for supposing this should happen, one province could only be benefited by it, and the others, in-

stead of gaining an independancy, would become more dependant than they are at present. If we would wish the capital of the British dominions to be so situated, as best to promote the advantage of the whole Empire, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a spot more proper than that on which the city of London is built. As the intercourse betwixt America and this island is open and uninterrupted, we ought to look upon our colonies there, merely as an extension of our insular territory, rendering us still *penitus toto divisos orbe*; and, if they are considered in this view, they will appear as worthy of our attention as any affairs on the continent of Europe.

Of late, many people have begun to be alarmed at the greatness of the Russian empire; but let us compare the extent, the populousness, and power of this so much dreaded Empire, with the extent and strength of the British empire. The territories belonging to Britain in Europe and America (if we include Canada, and all on the east side of the Mississippi,) are near equal in extent to the territory belonging to Russia, in Europe and Asia, reckoning all south from the 60 degree of latitude. As to the value of the northern desarts of Siberia and Tartary, that is greatly overbalanced by our settlements in the East Indies, and on the coast of Africa. The Russians, it is true, are superior to us in numbers of people; but, if we confine ourselves to the civilized inhabitants in each Empire (for little account is to be made of the barbarous Tartars subject to the one, or of the savages subject to the other) the superiority will probably be but very inconsiderable. Or, if we rather reckon only the number of wealthy nobles, the ingenious and skillful artists, expert manufacturers, and industrious

labourers in each state, the superiority may justly be concluded to be on our side. The easiness of communication contributes to the strength of a kingdom, and it is evident, that the merchandise of the Ohio, could be transported to Britain, in a shorter time than the caravans are conducted from the eastern parts of the Russian dominions to Petersburg. The numerous armies of the Russians make their power appear formidable; but when we consider that the revenues of that state are not above a sixth part of ours, and are not sufficient to put those armies in motion without foreign subsidies, their troops cannot be regarded as an actual force, but as an heavy burden upon themselves, which greatly retards the improvement of their country and the civilizing of their people.

But were their armies to be even more numerous than they are, their state could not justly be reckoned formidable, as their extensive land frontier is liable to be invaded by the Chinese, the Persians, the Turks, the Poles, the Germans, and the Swedes, all of whom except the Chinese are both powerful and warlike nations. Our frontiers, on the other hand, if we retain Canada and make the Mississippi the western boundary of our empire, cannot be invaded by land, but by small parties of American savages whose power can easily be controlled; and if an enemy should threaten to invade our distant territories by sea, our floating fortresses are always ready to carry succours thither, and to retaliate the injuries of the invaders. While we therefore maintain our superiority at sea unrivalled, our territories in America need not be looked upon as disjoined from Britain, and so long as they continue thus, we need not fear being over-topped by the great Russian empire, or by any other power in Europe.

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But as the American continent claimed by us, is inhabited not only by great numbers of civilized Europeans and their descendants, but also by multitudes of savages, if we would wish to see our power confirmed and peace solidly established there, we ought to make it our chief study to civilize the barbarous Indian tribes adjoining to our colonies. We have felt the pernicious effects of treating them with contemptuous pride and overbearing haughtiness, and of suffering packmen to wander among them and to cheat them in their dealings. We have also seen in the example of Sir William Johnson that they may be easily attached to us by acts of humanity, and by observing a most scrupulous sincerity in our transactions with them. If they were all civilized and made obedient subjects they would be a considerable addition to our power; but tho' we should not have the least dealings with them, our colonies on that continent would still be of the utmost importance to this nation. In all probability the Indians do not purchase British manufactures to the value of a pound a piece annually, and is this trade of such mighty consequence, that we should embroil ourselves continually on that account, sacrifice many superior considerations to it, and have the sword eternally drawn. While we suffer the worst of our subjects to travel among them, and to cheat and deceive them, 'tis but natural to expect that they who look upon private revenge as a natural right, will despise the formalities of complaining, and do themselves prompt justice upon the offenders. Some of our colonies, therefore, have prudently prohibited packmen from travelling among them, and have established truck-houses where the traffic is carried on under the direction of men of probity settled there as factors
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for the public. If all our colonies observed the same method, many occasions of a rupture would thereby probably be cut off, and a mutual good understanding become more permanent.

It would also be no dishonour to this nation, if we were earnestly to apply ourselves to familiarize them to our manner of life, and to instruct them in the Christian religion, and if four or five years residence among them were to be made the road to solid preferment in the church, I doubt not but many missionaries would quickly offer themselves. To attempt to influence the individuals among them to lay aside their own manners and adopt ours, would probably be but an unsuccessful labour, but if we could once persuade the chiefs of their tribes, and their leading men to glory in imitating us, we might reasonably expect that the fashion would quickly spread among their followers; for *Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis*. History furnishes us with several instances of princes and princesses converted to Christianity and introducing that religion among their heathen subjects. If two or three of the Indian chiefs were to be successively resident here, and allowed appointments like those granted to the ambassadors from the Barbary states; if they were taught that all of them being allies to the same great king, they ought not to war against each other; if they were persuaded to build better houses, and to have some costly furniture in them, their savage animosity against us, and against each other would probably cease, and they would begin to prefer settled habitations to a wandering life, which would be a considerable step to their forsaking their barbarous customs, and embracing the manners of civilized nations.

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But it would be vain to expect a continuance of tranquillity in America, if Canada should be restored to the French, or if they should be suffered to enjoy the free navigation of their river Mississippi. By retaining Canada and totally excluding them from that part of North America, on this side the river Mississippi, we save ourselves from the charge of defending a land frontier, and render the building of forts in the northern colonies unnecessary. Thus the whole extent of country bounded on the West by the Mississippi, and extending on the North to Hudson's Bay, could be protected at a less charge than would be required to defend one half of it, if the other half were ceded to the French. By excluding the French we oblige the Indians to be more tractable and submissive, for finding themselves encircled every where with Britons ready and able to revenge any insults from them, they would be under a necessity of continuing a friendly intercourse, or at least of abstaining from violences. Our colonists would likewise be induced to spread themselves diffusively, when they found that they might make new settlements with security; and it is for the interest of Britain that they should be widely scattered as planters, rather than be concentrated as manufacturers in large towns.

Some who erroneously estimate the national advantages arising from our conquests, as the merchant computes the advantage arising from his traffic, namely by the ballance of money that they bring into us, affirm that Guadalupe is of more importance to the nation than Canada, and that if we are to restore one of them at the peace, it ought to be the latter, as all the commodities that can be imported from thence are not a third of the value of those which Guadalupe can furnish

us with. But to those who think peace, security, and such an union of territory as doubles the strength of the whole, to be the most considerable national advantages, Canada and its dependancies will appear of more importance to us than the most wealthy of the French West India islands. England draws ten times as much money from Portugal as from Scotland, yet its union with the latter is of infinitely more importance to it than its connection with the former kingdom. The retaining of Canada, in all probability, will save this nation the expence of many millions, by cutting off any occasion of a rupture in those parts, and will soon double our strength on the continent of America; but we can hardly reap any advantage from the possession of Guadalupe that we could not acquire by cultivating the neutral islands in its neighbourhood.

But if we reflect on our successes during this war, and on the distresses of our enemy, it will, I think, be difficult to assign a reason why we should be reduced to the alternative of either giving up Guadalupe or restoring Canada. If the French could find sufficient resources for supporting the expence of the war; if they were superior on the ocean, had a most flourishing trade, and had conquered Jamaica and one or two of our northern colonies without having lost any thing considerable themselves, would they with such a superiority, think of the restitution of any of their conquests?

No doubt the conquerors, as well as the conquered, have need of peace; but it can hardly be made a question which of them are under the most pressing necessity to have tranquillity restored. The vanquished must certainly feel the miseries of the war in a much greater degree than the victors;

toys; it is more reasonable therefore that they should purchase a peace by relinquishing their claims to what they have not been able to defend, than that the victors should condescend to buy an accommodation by restoring conquests, which they find themselves fully able to maintain. If Guadalupe then should be judged worth the keeping on the terms of the capitulation, we are entitled by our present superiority to retain both it and Canada.

Tho' the French should be allowed to settle on the West of the Mississippi, it would not be proper to grant them the free navigation of that river with vessels of any force. Considering their encroaching disposition, 'tis probable they would make such a concession a handle for trading with the Indians on this side the river, and stirring them up to disturb any new settlements we might form in those parts, or on the banks of the Ohio. Were we on the other hand to keep two armed sloops successively stationed in those rivers, such a display of our power would awe the Indians more, and be less expensive to us than land forts. If the French were totally excluded, and the barbarity of the Indians was repressed, our present colonies would soon branch out into those fertile countries, and would supply them with settlers without any further drain from the mother country.

But when the branches are becoming every day more large and numerous, there is a necessity that the trunk which sustains them should also be enlarged. Tho' the power of Britain be augmented by her colonies, yet her chief dependance for maintaining her present or future greatness must be upon her internal strength, which ought to increase in proportion as her foreign settlements in-

create, to serve as a just counterpoise to their influence. The expences of government are almost all raised upon the inhabitants of this island alone, and it is they chiefly who compose our armies and man our fleets. The true source for supplying all these will be found to be great numbers of people, and those people employed in virtuous industry. Most of our writers on national affairs both antient and modern, seem to have almost wholly overlooked the great advantages of population and internal traffic, but have enlarged without ceasing on the benefit of foreign trade; and the same partial and mercenary spirit seems in times past to have even infected our national councils. For one act in favour of agriculture we have twenty in favour of commerce, and almost every year there are proposals canvassed for cultivating some new *branch* of foreign trade. But what gardener is so absurd as to think of cultivating the *branches* of his trees? He applies his culture to the root, and in his management of the branches, only takes care that no branch shall be so luxuriant as to deprive the others of proper nourishment.

It was an observation, I think, of Sir William Petty, that if all the people of Scotland and Wales were transplanted into England, and those countries were buried in the sea, it would be greatly for the advantage of England. This sentiment has been often repeated with applause, as a proof of shrewd discernment, tho' it is hardly possible to mention a more blind and partial decision. I will state a case, which is not like his out of the course of nature, and which plain sense might have dictated to many of our writers on trade, if they had not been so prejudiced as to refer almost all national advantages, not to the extension of territory and the peopling of that territory, but

to the extension of commerce, and the wealth arising from it. Suppose the whole island of Britain, contained double the number of its present inhabitants, and the cultivation of its lands was also doubled, it could not be long before its foreign commerce would be greatly enlarged without one new act of parliament in its favour, and the state would be twice as powerful as it now is, even tho' it were not so rich. Sir William Petty's false and narrow notion of estimating the power of a state in proportion to its wealth, seems to have been adopted by most of our writers on commerce, and has long been a prevalent and undisputed opinion; but the sentiments of the great Lord Bacon were very different. *Illud magis tritum, he says, quam verum, quod nervi belli sint pecunie.*

The wealth acquired by commerce is considered by writers on trade as the *summum bonum* of a state, and that channel which brings in most money is by them judged most profitable, tho' it perhaps prevents us from pursuing another which would give employment to twice the number of people; but in their opinion, no matter how few people, provided the ballance of trade be large. If a person at home earns annually forty pounds, and spends forty pounds, the nation, they affirm, *is nothing the better for him*; but one person employed in commerce, will, from the ballance of the trade carried on by him, bring annually five pounds into the nation, consequently it is the trader alone that advantages the state. But let us suppose the person staying at home, and spending all that he earns, to beget four children, he will in that view be as valuable a member of the commonwealth as the other, if he has no other merit to plead than that of adding five pounds yearly to

the national stock. On our West India planters in the valuation of their properties, rate the negro children at eight or ten pounds a head; is it not then reasonable that free born children in estimating the national stock should be valued at twice as much as negroes, as the arts and trades followed by them are of more importance to a state than the manual labour of slaves; Suppose we should double our commerce, without the acquisition of new people (which might be done, if all who are idle in the nation were set to work, and new machines were invented for shortening labour) yet even on this supposition, the public revenue would thereby be but very little augmented. But were the number of subjects to be doubled, tho' our commerce were hardly of greater extent than at present, either the public revenue would be doubled, or the taxes would be lowered one half. It is allowed that there is not such an abundance of money in France as in this island, and that the people there in general are much richer than the French. How comes it then that their revenue is so very considerable? The answer is plain, namely, that they have more than twice the number of Subjects that we have to raise it upon. Eighteen millions of people paying ten shillings a head, will raise a greater revenue than eight millions of people who are able to pay fifteen shillings each. If there were double the present inhabitants in this island there would be double the number of houses, and the value of land would also be doubled, consequently the land tax would amount to a sum twice as large as at present. On the same supposition there would be double the quantity of beer and all other exciseable commodities consumed, which would also double the revenue in that

that branch. But besides the increase of revenue, our commerce could not fail of being enlarged, which would augment the number of our sailors and the state would also be able to raise armies twice as numerous as the present, without distressing our manufactures. The power and greatness of the kingdom then depends much more upon numbers of people, if they are but so employed as to prevent the nation from losing by its foreign traffic, than upon the ballance of trade however considerable it may be.

As numbers of people are of the greatest importance to a state, and it is generally acknowledged that there is a great deficiency of population in this island, ought not we to encourage foreign Protestants to settle among us, by freely granting them the privileges of native subjects by the general act of naturalization. Our wars are unavoidably becoming every day more and more expensive, is it not then absolutely necessary to think of resources for enabling the nation to support that expence in such a manner as the individuals may not be burdened by it, either during a war itself or for generations afterwards. And to any person who will but divest himself of the commonly received prejudices, the truest resource for supplying the expences of the war, will appear to be great numbers of men, much rather than a large ballance of trade.

If means were pursued for augmenting the number of subjects, nothing could tend more to counterpoise the too great influence of the monied interest, as the properties of the landed gentlemen would increase in value in consequence of the new occupiers of houses and farms, and the revenues of the state would also increase, which would render borrowing less necessary, and be a fund for

paying off the debts already contracted without any new tax. The rising of rents, while money is every day sinking in its value, is but a mere imaginary augmentation of an estate; but by increasing the numbers of occupiers and consumers, both land and money would rise in value, and an estate might in that case be reckoned really improved.

Let us, as I before observed, consider Britain as the center of a vast empire, and the trunk that sustains many large and wide spreading branches, it will be evident that foreign commerce needs no longer be our principal concern; but that we ought to give our chief attention to the peopling of this fertile island to the remotest corners of it, that it may be able from itself to protect its distant settlements, afford them manufactures at an easy rate, and also supply them occasionally with new settlers, as emigrations thither will now probably be more frequent than they have been for some time past. Great Britain could never so easily subsist without foreign commerce as at present, for the productions of all soils and all climates may now be found in British territories.*

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If we regard the northern parts of America, we there find the productions of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden; in our southern colonies we raise the fruits of China, Persia, and Arabia; and the products of Italy, Spain, France, and Turkey, might easily be furnished to us from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia. Our attention to cultivate the various products suited to the climate of our different colonies, will in all probability be the most effectual means of counteracting the commercial spirit that is now every day more and more prevailing in almost all the nations of Europe. The superior advantages arising to Great Britain from the wide extent of her territories, have not escaped the observation of our neighbours, as appears from the following reflection of a judicious French writer: *Depuis que les intérêts*

An extensive state, if it is at the same time very populous, could not fail of being rich and powerful, tho' the whole of its manufactures were consumed within itself. The Chinese have but very little foreign trade, yet their domestic and internal traffic maintains upwards of ninety millions of inhabitants. The foreign commerce of the Turks is but very inconsiderable; yet no body will deny but that they are a very formidable power. The Russians, tho' their country is thinly peopled, and it will be evident that foreign commerce needs no de commerce, he says, ont une influence si marquée sur les principales opérations politiques, l'agriculture est devenue plus lumineuse, & plus florissante. Peut-être arrivera-t-il que la balance du commerce des nations sera uniquement celle du produit de leurs terres & de leurs colonies. L'Angleterre qui a fait de bonne heure l'importance de cette objet a défriché ses vastes déserts dont le produit a augmenté considérablement les richesses de la nation *. As many kinds of vines grow naturally in our colonies, it is surprising that we have so long neglected the attempting to supply ourselves with wine from thence. This commodity could never interfere with the produce of the mother country, and if brought to perfection, as there is the greatest reason to expect, considering the different climates of our colonies, would be a direct rivalry of one of the main branches of the commerce of the French, and hurt them more than the loss of many battles. A modern French writer computes that by the sale of their wines to foreigners they gain a million sterling annually, which is more than our colonists gain by the sale of their tobacco and rice together. The Virginia planters ought to be excited by their personal interest to attend to the cultivation of vines; for the demand for their staple commodity may soon be lessened, if the French succeed in their attempts to supply themselves wholly with tobacco of the growth of the southern provinces of France. Our colonists for these few years past have had the offer of a premium for cultivating vines from the laudable society for the encouragement of arts, manufactures, and commerce; but when we consider the greatness and importance of the object, it would seem to merit rather the consideration of parliament than of a private society.

* Corps d'observation de la société d'agriculture, de commerce, & des arts, établie par les états de Bretagne, années 1757, 1758.

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they are far from abounding in wealth, are nevertheless a potent nation, and capable of defending themselves against any state in Europe. If these nations who have an extensive territory, are formidable without foreign commerce, so may Britain, if we maintain our superiority at sea, and turn our attention to the further peopling of this island and the territories belonging to it. Not that I would wish the least decay in our foreign trade: on the contrary, the augmenting the number of people in this island, would not only increase the power, but would be the truest and easiest way of enlarging our commerce. I only mean, that, considering the extent of the British dominions, both in Europe and America, it is a narrow view to regard this nation merely as a commercial state, and the grossest absurdity, voluntarily to wish ourselves in the same situation with the Dutch, as to extent of territory, for the sake of having a large balance of wealth, flowing in to us from all our neighbours. The improving of our natural advantages, that is, the peopling our wide dominions but more particularly the island of Britain, with multitudes of industrious inhabitants, would render us both powerful and wealthy, without the support of foreign trade, which seems every day becoming more and more precarious, from the successful rivalship of many of our neighbouring states.

The Dutch being confined to a very narrow and barren territory, had no other means of maintaining their independency and rendering themselves powerful, than that of applying themselves to foreign commerce, by which they have indeed acquired great wealth; but, nevertheless, as their territory is small, they never can be a formidable state; and it is evident, that they have been protected

pected hitherto, more by the alliances of their neighbours, than by their own strength. The system of another European State, namely Poland, is quite different from that of the Dutch. Among the Poles, who have very little foreign commerce, trade is in great disrepute; but, as their nobles take delight in agriculture, and their country is fertile and extensive, it affords subsistence to a great number of inhabitants, which renders them a powerful nation, though they do not abound in wealth.

If either of those nations could unite to it the advantages of the other, it would doubtless be a most flourishing and formidable state; but a union of such different advantages is plainly impossible for the Dutch or Poles. Great Britain, however, having an extensive territory, that will admit of being extremely populous, as it has on every side a free communication with the sea, may easily unite the advantages peculiar to each of the above mentioned states, and is therefore greatly deficient in her policy, while she confines her attention solely to the advantages of commerce, and neglects those arising from population, which is much more suited to the greatness of her empire. Besides, population is so far from interrupting commerce, that it is the very basis of it; and could we by the offer of naturalization, and by other encouragements, prevail with great numbers of industrious foreigners to settle among us, we need give ourselves little concern about enlarging our foreign trade; for it would of itself force its way without public direction, if we only continue those bounties that have been found so serviceable in fostering infant manufactures.

We have in the course of this war, on a moderate computation, lost 20,000, of our soldiers buried in Germany; and our loss of men in our

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other expeditions by sea and land, in all probability, exceeds 60,000, in number. Should we not then wish to see their places supplied by others, who are desirous of making this country their home, and would come to us in the vigour of their age, without having burdened the nation with the expences of their infancy. A foreign manufacturer who comes hither either alone, or with his wife and children, with a design of making this country his future abode, is, from that moment, no longer a foreigner, but a most useful recruit, enlisted in the nation's service. The nation at present is evidently in great want of many such recruits, and if we could by an act of naturalization, draw great numbers of industrious foreigners hither, nothing could contribute more to lighten the expences of government to the individuals, and consequently to enable us to lower the prices of our manufactures, which is the truest means of extending our commerce. The landed Gentlemen particularly, would be doubly benefited by them; for they would not only occasion a further improvement of land, and an increase of houses, both which contribute to raise the rents of estates, but, by the share they themselves would bear in the public burdens, the amount of the taxes would be so increased, as to render a land tax, in time of peace, no longer necessary; and whither this is not an object worthy of the attention of the landed Gentlemen I leave them to consider. There is no rank of men in the state indeed, except the money brokers, who would not quickly feel the advantage of a considerable acquisition of foreigners; but, to these last, an increase of inhabitants would be very disagreeable, as the state, by acquiring such a natural support, would be able gradually to clear off its incumbrances, which would put a stop to their usurious traffic.

Pensil.

Pensilvania and our other northern colonies have felt no inconvenience from the many thousand Germans that have settled there; but when we consider the present advanced and prosperous state of our American settlements, and the deficiency of a full population in this island, in proportion to the extent of our dominion, it would appear, that the nation would reap much more advantage from the settlement of great numbers of industrious foreigners in Britain, than if they should transplant themselves into any of our colonies in America.

Could not almost all our cities and towns easily admit of being twice as large as they are; and if they were so enlarged, would not the value of the lands round them be considerably increased, and would not the nation, in time of war, be able to exert itself with double vigour. Some indeed most absurdly allege, that all trades and professions are already overstocked; and to suffer strangers to flow in upon us, would be a means of doubling the number of our poor and consequently increase the distresses of the nation. But this allegation, if it proved any thing, would prove too much; for, upon the same principle, we ought to prohibit all marriages for a certain number of years, to prevent for some time the birth of any more children, till those who are already born should in part be provided for. It would doubtless be thought absurd to affirm, that the settling of 100 new smiths at Birmingham, or of 100 new weavers at Manchester, would increase the poor of those towns, and it will appear equally absurd, if we make the same supposition in regard to all the cities and towns in Great Britain.

That there are great numbers of idle persons in this island is an undoubted truth; but this is so

far from being owing to an overabundance of people, that, on the contrary, it is chiefly occasioned by a scarcity of inhabitants, and, if Great Britain contained double the number of people, there would be fewer idle persons in it than at present, providing the laws relating to the poor were new modeled and justly regulated. Scotland and Ireland are thinly peopled in comparison of England, yet the number of people wanting employment in those countries is more considerable than in this part of the island; and many of their inhabitants, merely for want of work at home, come and seek employment in the populous cities of England. From this instance alone, not to produce others, it would appear, that there is the greatest want of employment in those countries that are most thinly inhabited, especially when the custom of forming new settlements has become obsolete, as in Scotland and Ireland, which is a great defect in their policy*. In a populous country, on the other hand, the reciprocal wants of the inhabitants create employment for all of them, and those who follow the most insignificant

* Many young and industrious manufacturers abstain from marrying, or quit their native country for want of having an easy opportunity of settling in life, as the value of lands near inhabited places is very high, and the rents of houses are a burden too heavy for them to bear. They might, however, at a very small expence, be eased of both these inconveniences, if the parliaments of G. Britain and Ireland would, every three or four years, mark out spaces for new towns, at proper distances from any other habitations, and offer settlements in them *gratis*, to all manufacturers, who should marry within that term and to none else. The value of even good land, in waste places, is but a mere trifle; and to settle 1000 industrious families, in this manner, would not require such a large sum, as what is annually granted for endowing the foundling hospital, though, in all probability, it would be a means of raising a greater number of subjects to the state, than that very costly poor house. A capital objection indeed may be made to this proposal; it is not fashionable.

professions often procure a better livelihood than the possessors of hundreds of acres in a country that is but thinly inhabited.

Absurd prejudices, when loudly trumpeted by a powerful faction, have often obstructed national measures; but as our parties and prejudices have now most happily ceased, and our rulers, of late, have evidently pursued the welfare of the state, with more discernment, and more enlarged views, than formerly, we may hope, that the only opposition, a general bill of naturalization would now meet with, would be from the clamours of a few interested tradesmen or those of the ignorant mob. The outcry of the multitude, however, ought not to be regarded in matters that appear, with the evidence of mathematical demonstrations, to persons the least acquainted with history and politics. Of the several millions of people in England, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but a very few persons had prudence and foresight enough, to commend the enterprises of Sir Walter Raleigh, and to foretel the benefit his discoveries would procure to the nation. He was openly reviled on the stage as a knave and villain, while the learned men abroad, as well as at home, were addressing their works to him, as to one of the most illustrious characters in Europe. He, however, notwithstanding the clamours of the mob, pursued his noble and patriot designs with unabated ardour, being conscious, that the censures of his envious coteremporaries would be repaid with the admiration of posterity.

Edward III. not only granted a free naturalization to foreign manufacturers, but even supported them upon their arrival here by an allowance from the public treasury, till such time as they should get employment; and like a great prince, he checked the turbulent spirit of some
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of the inhabitants of his chief cities, who, from narrow and selfish views, wanted to insult and oppress the new comers. His steady perseverance in pursuing the welfare of his dominions, though in direct opposition to the prejudices of the age in which he lived, was quickly attended with most beneficial consequences. The foreign manufacturers having inspired the other inhabitants with a spirit of industry, the national commerce was so greatly increased by their joint endeavours, that, notwithstanding his expensive wars, his subjects, at his death, abounded in wealth, though, before his reign, they were remarkable for their meanness and poverty.

To conclude, the settling of great numbers of industrious foreigners in this island, would so evidently promote the landed and commercial interest of the state, that, as a farther inducement to tempt them hither, we ought, besides the benefits of naturalization, to offer them, if they do not chuse to settle in any town, the property of so much ground, as should be requisite for a small house, in those parts of the island that are not yet cultivated; and in imitation of Edward III. to disperse proclamations to this purpose all over Europe. In the reign of Queen Anne it was proposed, to plant the Palatine refugees in the new forest in Hampshire, which, before it was desolated by William the conqueror, is said to have contained thirty six parish churches; but a violent faction, who prided themselves in opposing national measures, prevented that salutary scheme from taking effect. That fine spot, which has been unaccountably neglected, could contain many thousand foreigners; and there are many other uncultivated parts of the island where great numbers of them might also, very conveniently, be settled.

The

The nation is not only weakened for want of a due proportion of inhabitants; but is also greatly distressed by the sloth and idleness that prevails among the poor, great numbers of whom are, in a manner, legally intitled to live without industry. One of the objections against a standing army, in time of peace, is, the great expence to the nation of maintaining 16, or 20,000 idle men, who ought to support themselves by their own labour; yet we give no attention to the burden of another army, consisting of no less than 600,000 persons; for such the number of those receiving alms was computed to be about 60 years ago, and it has rather encreased, than diminished, since that time. Supposing one half of these were really invalids, or infirm, who were justly intitled to public charity, is it not, however, a disgrace to our national policy to suffer the other half to prey upon the state, when, by proper regulations, they might be made to contribute to the support of it.

The act for maintenance of the poor is stiled, by an eminent writer, the true bane and destruction of all the English manufactures in general, as it apparently encourages sloth and beggary. If that act, or any others relating to the poor, are found impolitic and burthensome, ought we to scruple to make a thorough reform in them, or to new model them entirely * When we consider what an additional spirit and vigour it would give to the state,

* Tho' the ministers of Queen Elizabeth were remarkable for their policy and prudence, yet they were far from being infallible; and the following observation of a judicious writer in the reign of Charles II. will shew that her parliaments did not always understand the true interest of the nation. "The act of the 5. Eliz. 4" he says, "provides that no person shall take an apprentice for woollen manufactures in any town corporate, market town, or village, except such apprentice be his son, or else that the parents have the clear yearly

state, were the labour of 2, or 300,000 of its people to be added to the national stock of industry, it must appear astonishing, that the means of effecting such an important purpose have been deferred from year to year, even in profound peace, while affairs of very little consequence have deeply interested our legislators. To countenance by law, the maintaining of the poor, I mean those that are not infirm, any other way than by employing them, is certainly a most faulty establishment, an establishment which, if found among the Mohawks or Iroquois would be ridiculed by us, as contrary to common sense, and mentioned as an instance of their barbarism.

For many years past, the mischiefs arising from the idleness of the poor, and the burden of maintaining them have often been complained of; but very few instances ^{can be given} of any parliamentary attempts to redress those grievances. Since the reign of Elizabeth indeed, till within these few years past, the weakness of some of our princes, the internal disturbances in the kingdom, the foreign wars we were engaged in to check the ambition of

“ yearly value of two pounds inheritance in towns corporate,
 “ and three pounds in market towns and villages; whence it
 “ follows that the corporations being poor, and scarce half
 “ inhabited by not admitting others to supply their number
 “ and defects, become daily more poor and less inhabited.
 “ The children of poor people in villages being also denied
 “ by the act of the 31. Eliz. 7. to erect cottages when they
 “ become more than the tenements can receive or can be
 “ employed in husbandry, necessarily turn vagrant beg-
 “ gars, stealers, canters, or at best, if they forsake not the
 “ nation, do swell the suburbs of London already too big,
 “ be hoflers, tapsters, drawers, and sellers of strong waters.
 “ As the two acts of Eliz. abovementioned, have brought all
 “ these mischiefs upon town and country, so were they a
 “ necessary preparative for the enacting that of the 43. of
 “ Eliz. 2. for maintaining idle and lazy persons in all the
 “ parishes of England, which has produced so many and so
 “ great inconveniencies.” *Coke's England's Improvement.*

Lewis

Lewis XIV. and the factious contests, occasioned by a corrupt administration, have successively prevented our rulers from reforming many domestic abuses, which could only be removed by a steady resolution, and by calm and deliberate counsels. The happy tranquillity, however, which the nation, in all likelihood, will enjoy upon the conclusion of the present war, will afford leisure to enquire into and correct many abuses; and as the idleness of the poor, and the heavy burden of their maintenance, are among the chief public grievances, we may hope, that our legislators will at length apply themselves with zeal and earnestness, to establish such new regulations as may effectually remove those evils.

One well digested law of two or three sheets of paper would tend to clothe more naked, and feed more hungry, than all the pecuniary donations that are granted for charitable uses in Great Britain annually. The new regulations therefore ought not to be the result of a few transient thoughts, hastily composed from an imperfect view of the subject; but ought in every particular to be maturely weighed, that the future establishments may be solidly founded on consistent and comprehensive principles; and there may be no occasion for patching them afterwards by frequent alterations and amendments.

Several authors, particularly Davenant, Postlethwayt, and Fielding, have proposed schemes for employing and maintaining the poor; and all of them have recommended work-houses. If their writings were consulted, or if a public reward was offered for the best plan for providing for the poor, the subject would probably be thoroughly canvassed, and such information given, in all points relating to it, that it would be easy for the legislature to form a new and just system of regulations.

Davenant advises to commit the management of the whole poor of the kingdom to a company or corporation, the governors of which should reside in London, and have inferior officers in every parish. It was to private undertakers, he says, that we owe the order and method first introduced into the Post Office, Customs, and Excise. If these branches, therefore, which certainly are as intricate and as diffusive as the direction of the poor could be, were never fully understood till they were farmed, we have the greatest reason to expect, that by the management of a private company, the idle poor would soon be made useful members of the state.

The overseers of the poor, at present, seem industriously to discourage work-houses, whether from some interested motive, or from a desire to save themselves the trouble of inspecting them, I shall not determine; but when it has been proposed to erect work-houses for the poor, they have absurdly pleaded, that it would be merely burdening their parishes with an additional expence. They allege, that those who are kept at labour in work-houses cannot earn by their industry so much as will pay for their maintenance; and likewise, that if they could, there is no vent for those branches of manufacture, which they are capable of employing themselves upon.

As to the first of these objections, though the poor could not by their labour earn their whole subsistence, yet those who are not infirm might certainly earn a great part of it; and therefore ought not to be allowed to subsist idly, which is only an encouragement to them to indulge in vice and profligacy. But it may even be questioned, whether the poor, if kept at work, under proper regulations, might not maintain themselves entirely by their own labour, as

we have an instance of the surprising effects of application and industry in the city of Norwich, where, it is said, that upwards of 5000 children, under ten years of age, gain a livelihood by their labour in some branches of manufacture.

The last objection, is absolutely false, for, allowing that the poor, by proper regulations might be kept at work, it is impossible but the wants of society, or the demands of foreign trade, must create a market for the fruits of their industry, however trifling they might be. Doubtless many trades and handicrafts require an apprenticeship of several years, before a person can be a proficient in them; but it is no less certain, that, in many kinds of employment, very little teaching is necessary, and that application, and a willing mind, would soon qualify the most inexpert for practising them. If we look over the list of goods imported and exported, we will find many hundred weight of twine, yarn, canvass, &c. weekly imported from Holland. Could not these articles, and many others of a like kind, be fabricated in our workhouses? Who can answer, that they are not actually fabricated in the work-houses in Holland, where 'tis well known the poor are kept constantly employed? If the poor of that country can be made useful to the state, it is certainly a great absurdity to pretend, that, in this kingdom, their labour could be of no benefit to the public.

According to the present regulations for providing for the poor, all parishes are put to a great expence be endeavouring each to throw the burden of itinerant beggars off themselves. But if workhouses were once established throughout the kingdom, and all made subject to the same direction, there would no longer be any need of the law for passing of vagrants, which affords a pretence for raising large sums upon the people;

for wherever a vagrant was found he might be made an useful subject by conducting him to the nearest workhouse; and if he wanted to go to his own parish, he might be transmitted without expence from workhouse to workhouse, and earn his subsistence in his way homewards. Of this we have an example in the practice of the journeymen in the hat manufactory, among whom it is a law that all new comers shall be immediately presented with work. By the convenience of this law, several journeymen in that trade, have travelled thro' almost all the market towns in England, without having more than a day's wages in their pocket when they set out on their journey.

Were workhouses universally established, the industrious poor, many of whom are only employed occasionally, might apply to be employed there at those times when they want other business; and those places might also serve for houses of call, where farmers, manufacturers, brick-makers, &c. might have recourse for supernumerary hands whenever they should have occasion for them. The general establishment of workhouses would also strike a terror into those troops of licentious vagabonds, who over-run the kingdom, and live in open contempt of both divine and human laws. Their insolence is encouraged by the present neglect of the legislature; but if they found that it was impracticable for them any longer to indulge their idle life, they would probably not be so daring, and their numbers would soon decrease. Almost all those vagabonds ought to be looked upon as felons, for they daily steal more by canting words than what others are transported for, and if they cannot be induced by any motives, to apply themselves to work here, it were indeed better for the nation that they were really transported and sent as slaves
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to our West India colonies. Many of the beggars who infest the streets of this metropolis, finding no restraint laid upon them, impudently breed up their little children in the same infamous profession; and the young vagabonds who ought to be taken and sent to houses of correction and instruction, are imprudently encouraged and commended forsooth, for their insinuating address, which is an inducement to them to persevere in their idle callings, without ever thinking of industry. While those beggars are left to the cognizance of constables, little reformation can be expected; but if workhouses were established, and a porter, chairman, or any other person was to be entitled to a reward of two shillings for bringing one of them to those houses, the streets in all probability would soon be cleared of them, and many who now spend their time idly with an aversion to industry, would apply themselves to work at home, to avoid being forced to labour in public workhouses. Their children ought likewise to be taken from them; for it could not be looked upon as any just hardship to deprive them of the precious liberty of a gipsy and vagabond; and those who should undertake to instruct and educate them should be intitled to their work for a term of years twice or thrice as long as the usual time of apprenticeship.

The employment of the poor, the punishment of felons, and the naturalization of foreigners have been the subject of parliamentary deliberation within these few years past: but the war intervening called off the attention of the legislature for some time to more pressing objects. Upon the return of peace, however, we have the greatest reason to hope, that the consideration of these and many other essential points, relating to the domestic government of the kingdom will be again resumed,

resumed, particularly the means for lessening the national debts and incumbrances, which point will be far from being the most difficult to be accomplished, if pursued with steadiness and resolution. The throne is at present possessed by a virtuous and active prince, we have a parliament chosen without the intervention of ministerial influence, and the people seem to express a desire of seeing the flagrant abuses that have so long prevailed in many branches of public administration at length reformed; could we then wish for a more favourable opportunity of destroying the system of corruption, which has gradually brought the nation to the very brink of a precipice. The venal tribe who have long countenanced a prostitution of principle, because it best promoted their mercenary and selfish views, may indeed attempt to frustrate the endeavours of an upright king, and honest and independant parliament; but it is to be hoped that their sophisms will no longer be able to blind the nation, and that the clamours raised by them will only redound to their own confusion. The present happy union of integrity and authority gives us the fairest prospect of soon seeing those political grievances, which have been the consequence of a long period of corruption, removed, and an end put to the rule and direction of Jews, jobbers, and contractors, who for many years past have preyed with the utmost rapacity upon the distresses of the public. If the patriot designs of the sovereign, and the zeal of an independent parliament are seconded by the endeavours of honest men, the nation will easily emerge from its present difficulties, its power and influence will increase, the sciences and arts will flourish, and the reign of George III. be the most glorious period of the British history.